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ABSTRACT
Blockchain in recent years has exploded in popularity with Ethereum being one of
the leading blockchain platforms. Solidity is a widely used scripting language for creating
smart contracts in Ethereum applications. Quality assurance in Solidity contracts is of
critical importance because bugs or vulnerabilities can lead to a considerable loss of
financial assets. However, it is unclear what level of quality assurance is provided in
many of these applications.
Mutation testing is the process of intentionally injecting faults into a target
program and then running the provided test suite against the various injected faults.
Mutation testing is used to evaluate the effectiveness of a test suite, measuring the test
suite’s capability of covering certain types of faults. This thesis presents Deviant, the first
implementation of a mutation testing tool for Solidity smart contracts. Deviant
implements mutation operators that cover the unique features of Solidity according to our
constructed fault model, in addition to traditional mutation operators that exist for other
programming languages.
Deviant has been applied to five open-source Solidity projects: MetaCoin [22],
MultiSigWallet [23], Alice [21], aragonOS [24], and OpenZeppelin [25]. Experimental
results show that the provided test suites result in low mutation scores. These results
indicate that the provided tests cannot ensure high-level assurance of code quality. Such
evaluation results offer important guidelines for Solidity developers to implement more
effective tests in order to deliver trustworthy code and reduce the risk of financial loss.
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................1
CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK .........................................4
2.1 Blockchain .........................................................................................................4
2.2 Ethereum and Solidity........................................................................................6
2.3 Quality Assurance for Smart Contracts ...........................................................10
2.4 Mutation Testing ..............................................................................................19
2.4.1 muJava ..............................................................................................22
2.4.2 Stryker ...............................................................................................23
CHAPTER THREE: THE DESIGN OF DEVIANT .........................................................25
3.1 Overview ..........................................................................................................25
3.2 Design Challenges ...........................................................................................27
3.2.1 Program Validity...............................................................................27
3.2.2 Language Evolution ..........................................................................28
3.2.3 Ethereum Evolution ..........................................................................29

vi

3.2.4 Reasonable Operators .......................................................................30
3.2.5 Performance ......................................................................................30
3.3 Fault Model of Solidity Smart Contracts .........................................................32
3.4 Mutation Operators ..........................................................................................35
3.4.1 Intra-Statement Level........................................................................35
3.4.2 Intra-Function Level .........................................................................39
3.4.3 Intra-Module Level ...........................................................................42
3.4.4 Inter-Module Level ...........................................................................46
3.4.5 Mutation Operator Relationship to Fault Types ...............................47
CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................51
4.1 Implementation of Deviant ..............................................................................51
4.2 Implementation Issues .....................................................................................57
CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION .............................................................60
5.1 Experiment .......................................................................................................60
5.2 Analysis............................................................................................................66
5.2.1 Gas Mutants ......................................................................................67
5.2.2 Address Mutants ...............................................................................67
5.2.3 Address Function Mutants ................................................................68
5.2.4 Data Location Mutants ......................................................................69
5.2.5 Event Mutants ...................................................................................69
5.2.6 Selfdestruct Mutants .........................................................................70
5.2.7 Exception-Handling Mutants ............................................................71
5.2.8 Modifier Mutants ..............................................................................72

vii

5.2.9 Function Type Mutants .....................................................................73
5.2.10 Function Visibility Mutants ............................................................73
5.2.11 Library Function Visibility Mutants ...............................................74
5.2.12 State Variable Visibility Mutants....................................................74
5.3 Threats to Validity ...........................................................................................75
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................77
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................78
APPENDIX A ....................................................................................................................82
A.1 General Intra-Statement Level Mutation Operators........................................83

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1

Address Mutation Operators ..................................................................... 36

Table 3.2

Address Function Mutation Operators ...................................................... 38

Table 3.3

Selfdestruct Mutation Operators ............................................................... 40

Table 3.4

Exception-Handling Mutation Operators .................................................. 41

Table 3.5

State Variable Mutation Operators ........................................................... 42

Table 3.6

Function Type Mutation Operators ........................................................... 43

Table 3.7

Function Visibility Mutation Operators .................................................... 44

Table 3.8

Library Function Visibility Operators ...................................................... 46

Table 3.9

Fault Types with Associated Mutation Operators .................................... 47

Table 5.1

Subject Program Metrics........................................................................... 62

Table 5.2

Subject Programs and Their Contracts Used for Mutation ....................... 63

Table 5.3

Subject Program Experimental Results Including Potential Equivalent
Mutants ..................................................................................................... 65

Table 5.4

Number of Live Mutants for each Mutant Type of Solidity-Specific
Features ..................................................................................................... 66

Table A.1

Binary Mutation Operators ....................................................................... 84

Table A.2

Unary Mutation Operators ........................................................................ 85

Table A.3

Assignment Mutation Operators ............................................................... 86

Table A.4

Literal Mutation Operators ....................................................................... 87

Table A.5

Intra-Module Level Mutation Operators ................................................... 90

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1

Blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain model [12] ............................................. 5

Figure 2.2

State transition model in the Ethereum blockchain model [12].................. 8

Figure 3.1

Architecture of Deviant............................................................................. 26

Figure 4.1

Home Page for Deviant GUI..................................................................... 52

Figure 4.2

Mutation Operators Page for Deviant GUI ............................................... 53

Figure 4.3

Report Page for Deviant GUI ................................................................... 54

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
EVM

Ethereum Virtual Machine

dApp

Decentralized Application

AST

Abstract Syntax Tree

UTXO

Unspent Transaction Output

GUI

Graphical User Interface

JSON

JavaScript Object Notation

FSM

Finite State Machine

xi

1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is an increasingly popular technology that led to one of the biggest
economic anomalies in recent years. As a popular platform for blockchain applications,
Ethereum provides a Turing-complete instruction set [12], allowing for the development
of more computationally expressive smart contracts in blockchain applications. Among
the several high-level programming languages that can compile into Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) bytecode, this thesis focuses on Solidity. Different from traditional
programs, a Solidity smart contract cannot be simply patched after it has been compiled
and added to the blockchain because of the nature of Ethereum and blockchain. Quality
assurance of smart contracts is therefore extremely important in the development process.
For example, a vulnerability in the DAO (decentralized autonomous organization)
resulted in the loss of approximately $50 million worth of ether (Ethereum’s
cryptocurrency) [36].
As for traditional software development, software testing is one of the common
techniques for quality assurance in any programming language, Solidity included.
Software testing exercises a Solidity program with test cases, aiming to find faults or
vulnerabilities. Most of the existing popular open source Solidity projects have included
built-in tests. Nevertheless, it is unclear what level of code quality can be assured by
these tests or how effective the tests can be. One way to assess the testing effectiveness is
to evaluate how many types of faults that can be revealed. In reality, however, real-world
projects seldom keep track of every fault that has occurred during their development
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processes. To address this issue, a widely-applied approach is mutation testing, which
aims to simulate programming faults by creating mutants of a given program [40]. Each
mutant has one fault injected by a mutation operator. A mutant is said to be killed if it
fails one or more test. A live mutant not killed by any test can be either faulty or
equivalent to the original program. Mutation score, i.e., the mutant-killing ratio between
the number of mutants killed and the total number of non-equivalent mutants, is often
used to indicate the fault detection capability of given tests. Mutation testing has been
applied to various programming languages, such as Java, C, and JavaScript. Experiments
have shown that mutants are indeed similar to real faults for the purpose of evaluating
testing techniques [41].
In this paper, we present Deviant, a mutation testing tool for Solidity smart
contracts. It aims to automatically generate mutants of a given Solidity project that
simulate various faults that may occur during the programming process, and
automatically run the test cases of the given Solidity project against each mutant so as to
evaluate the effectiveness of the given tests. Thus, Deviant can help Solidity developers
deliver higher quality code, reduce the risk of financial loss, and increase user
satisfaction.
This research is the first attempt to apply mutation testing to Solidity smart
contracts. The contributions are twofold:
•

In addition to the mutation of traditional programming constructs (e.g.,
expression and inheritance), Deviant covers all the features that are unique
to Solidity smart contracts. This allows for the evaluation of tests that
target Solidity-specific features.
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•

Deviant has been applied to five Solidity programs to evaluate the
effectiveness of their tests. The results indicate that these tests have not
achieved high mutation scores and thus cannot provide a high-level
assurance of code quality.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter Two introduces
background information and related work on blockchain, Ethereum/Solidity, quality
assurance for smart contracts, and mutation testing. Chapter Three describes the design of
Deviant, focusing on the fault model and Solidity-specific mutation operators. Chapter
Four discusses the implementation. Chapter Five presents the experimental results and
provides analysis. Chapter Five concludes the paper.
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Chapter Two presents the background information and related work for
blockchain, Ethereum/Solidity, quality assurance of smart contracts, and mutation testing.
Section 2.1 gives the background of blockchain and explains why it is a growing trend
among software developers. Section 2.2 explains Ethereum and Solidity, highlighting
uniqueness and differences that exist between Ethereum and the earliest form of
blockchain. Section 2.3 reviews related work in quality assurance for smart contracts and
how it relates to our work. Finally, subsection 2.4 concludes with an overview of
mutation testing and its purpose.
2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is a data structure comprised of records that are linked together using
cryptography [1]. The blockchain can be described as a decentralized distributed database
or ledger. A blockchain is considered decentralized due to the fact that there is no central
authority that controls what happens on the blockchain. The blockchain is controlled by
the nodes that participate in the blockchain network, where each node that is participating
has a copy of the blockchain. This means that if a malicious user were to try and fake
parts of the blockchain, it would be easily considered invalid as everyone else on the
blockchain has access to all the records that exist. Because every node on the blockchain
has access to the records that exist, all of the nodes in the network are connected to one
another, which is why the blockchain is considered distributed. A blockchain can be
thought of as a database because the blockchain allows for the storage and retrieval of
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data, while it is also considered a ledger because information is always being appended to
the blockchain. This means that information is constantly being added to the blockchain,
never removed or altered. This feature of the blockchain is called immutability and is
crucial for confirming the history of transactions that actually take place on the
blockchain. The earliest form of blockchain, Bitcoin, was invented by an anonymous user
going by the alias Satoshi Nakamoto [2].
Figure 2.1 shows blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain model, where the block
contains the information such as: the time the block was created, the unique nonce
number, the hash of the previous block, and the list of the transactions that have taken
place since the previous block was added.

Figure 2.1

Blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain model [12]

Blockchain technologies use scripting languages for their transactions, including
Bitcoin. While Bitcoin might be extremely relevant to this day, it still has several major
weaknesses with its own language, Script. The first noticeable difference between Script
and other common programming languages is that it is not Turing-complete, meaning
that it does not support loops or recursion. This feature of Bitcoin was an intentional
design choice, as Bitcoin wanted to prevent the halting problem that exists in Turingcomplete languages. The halting problem is essentially given a Turing-complete
language, how can we determine if the program will actually stop execution. If the
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Bitcoin blockchain supported loops or recursion, then it is highly-likely an attack would
take place in the form of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or a programmer error would
lead to infinite execution. With the removal of loops and recursion, Bitcoin can ensure
that the script execution will eventually stop.
Blockchain also uses a specific record keeping model called Unspent Transaction
Output (UTXO). The UTXO model is named as such because output from previous
transactions are used as input for new transactions. What this means is that when a
transaction takes place, the entirety value of the user’s UTXO is used as input for the
transaction. The designated amount of Bitcoin is sent to the given address, where the
remaining value from the Bitcoin UTXO is actually sent back to the sender’s address in
the form of a new UTXO.
Bitcoin is however not the only blockchain platform that exists. There have been
many blockchain platforms that have been introduced since Bitcoin’s inception, most of
which have made an effort to improve on some of the concepts behind Bitcoin. In some
cases, these new blockchain platforms introduce new ideas entirely or are made
specifically for certain purposes.
2.2 Ethereum and Solidity
Ethereum is one of the most popular blockchain platforms that exist today, mostly
due to its own innovative design decisions that have differentiated it from Bitcoin. There
are several languages that can compile to Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode;
however, the most popular of all the scripting languages for Ethereum is Solidity. This
section introduces the Ethereum blockchain model and also introduces the scripting
language Solidity.
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The philosophy behind Ethereum is to provide a blockchain with an instruction
set that is simple, universal, modular, agile, and non-discriminatory [12]. Ethereum needs
to be simple so that an average programmer can implement a specification without
trouble. In a similar vein, Ethereum must be universal such that if the program can be
mathematically defined, it should be able to be implemented within Solidity. Ethereum
must be also modular so that the separate components of Ethereum are self-contained,
while also being agile so that if any of these modules need to be updated, it can be.
Finally, Ethereum needs to be non-discriminatory such that Ethereum should not actively
try to restrict specific categories of usage. There are the primary concepts that were
considered in the design of the Ethereum blockchain.
The Ethereum model, unlike Bitcoin, is based on the account model. Ethereum
accounts contains key data values that make the Ethereum protocol work. Like Bitcoin,
Ethereum accounts contain a nonce, which is a counter to make sure that transactions can
only happen once, meaning that the nonce should be unique. Ethereum accounts also
contain the balance for that specific account, where the currency that Ethereum uses is
known as Ether. This is different from the Bitcoin model, which does not necessarily
have a UTXO matching directly to an account. Another important aspect of Ethereum is
that an account may optionally contain contract code. This means that there are two types
of accounts for Ethereum, externally owned and contract codes. The externally owned
accounts are controlled by private keys, whereas the contract codes are controlled by the
contract code that is stored on the account.
Transactions are an important part of Ethereum that refer to the signed data
package that stores a message to be sent from an externally owned account. The

8
transactions contain: the recipient of the message, a signature of the sender, the amount of
ether to transfer from sender to recipient, an optional data field, a STARTGAS value that
is representative of the maximum number of computational steps the transaction
execution is allowed to take, and a GASPRICE value that represents the fee the sender
pays per computational step. The STARTGAS and GASPRICE values are incredibly
crucial to prevent DoS attacks. As mentioned previously with Bitcoin, a blockchain is
susceptible to DoS attacks if code running on the blockchain causes infinite execution.
Bitcoin prevented this by not implementing a Turing-complete language. However, since
Ethereum is considered Turing-complete, Ethereum uses gas to prevent this problem. Gas
is a resource that is used by contracts that are executing code and when the gas runs out,
then the code will stop executing. An example of an Ethereum state transition is given in
Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2

State transition model in the Ethereum blockchain model [12]

There are currently several scripting languages that exist that can be compiled into
EVM bytecode that can be deployed to the Ethereum blockchain. In fact, any developer
can create their own language as long as they write a compiler that can compile the
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language into valid EVM bytecode. The most popular of these scripting languages is
Solidity. Solidity is a scripting language that is designed to be simple and rather intuitive
for most programmers. To achieve these features, Solidity is designed to closely resemble
JavaScript, sharing many of the same basic programming constructs and syntax. Solidity
is commonly used to create decentralized applications (dApps), which are applications
that take advantage of the inherent features that come with the blockchain model. While
it may commonly be assumed that blockchain can only be used for cryptocurrency, it has
also been demonstrated to be useful in several areas. In fact, there have been several realworld and several proof-of-concept projects that have demonstrated the usefulness of
blockchain in fields such as online voting, healthcare, and governance systems. In many
cases, Solidity is often used as the language for implementing these projects because of
its simplicity and similarity to traditional programming languages.
Ethereum, while being innovative in the field of blockchain, is still susceptible to
faults and vulnerabilities. This can be especially troublesome considering that the
Ethereum blockchain is immutable, meaning that once contract code has been deployed
to the blockchain, it cannot simply be patched. Naturally, Solidity will inherit these faults
and vulnerabilities considering that the Solidity code is compiled and deployed to the
Ethereum blockchain. However, Solidity has its own faults and vulnerabilities that are
unique to itself. This is because the Solidity compiler may potentially create faulty or
vulnerable EVM bytecode, given that like all code, isn’t guaranteed to be safe if it is
implemented incorrectly. Of course, there is also a potential for Solidity developers to
introduce their own faults in their application. Because Ethereum and Solidity are
relatively new technologies, there are some concepts that are not entirely understood by
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many in the Ethereum community. In fact, throughout Ethereum and Solidity’s lifespan,
there have been several instances where a fault or vulnerability has had a tremendous
effect for users of the Ethereum blockchain. For example, a company known as The DAO
(decentralized autonomous organization) contained a vulnerability (known as reentrancy)
that led to an attacker stealing approximately $50 million [36] worth of ether (Ethereum’s
cryptocurrency). When these situations happen, it typically requires a hard fork of the
Ethereum blockchain. A hard fork occurs when a non-backwards compatible protocol
change occurs in the blockchain. This means that nodes (users) that wish to use the latest
version of the Ethereum blockchain must update their Ethereum version to be current or
else their future transactions will not be valid on the latest version of the blockchain.
Because of the consensus requirements of blockchain, these hard forks require a majority
vote in favor of the hard fork. This means that performing a hard fork can be quite a
nuisance for the Ethereum community if they constantly have to do so. In a similar
manner, Solidity can be quite troublesome if there exists faults or vulnerabilities in
contract code. When the Solidity code is stored on the blockchain, it is immutable,
meaning that they cannot patch a bug if they find it. Because of this, quality assurance for
smart contracts is especially important.
2.3 Quality Assurance for Smart Contracts
With smart contracts having the capability of managing a considerable amount of
assets, there has been much research done in the area of quality assurance for Ethereum
and Solidity smart contracts. In the case of security, there have been many surveys done
on vulnerabilities that exist in the Ethereum platform. Atzei et al. [3] conducted a survey
on the security on Ethereum, particularly the vulnerabilities and faults that exist in both
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Ethereum and Solidity. Atzei provides a fault taxonomy that describes the vulnerabilities
and faults, breaking them down into three levels: Solidity, EVM, and Blockchain.
Solidity vulnerabilities are the vulnerabilities that exist because of the improper use of the
Solidity language by the programmer or by the language itself. EVM vulnerabilities are
the vulnerabilities that exist in the instruction set or limitations that exist in the actual
implementation of Ethereum. Finally, blockchain vulnerabilities are those that exist
because of the limitations of the blockchain model. Atzei also surveyed several attacks
that exist on Ethereum particularly the famous DAO attack and others such as other
various vulnerabilities that exist in other applications. This survey concludes that there
are some key areas that will be researched in the foreseeable future such as verification of
smart contracts and low-level attacks. In our research, we primarily attempt to replicate
the faults from the taxonomy that we can directly observe in Solidity. These faults are as
follows:
1. Call to the unknown: There are two primary ways that a call to the
unknown fault can occur. One reason that a call to the unknown fault can
occur is if the smart contract developer sends the wrong data to the
receiving contract while using the call function. For example, if a
developer tries to call a function that doesn’t exist in a contract, then the
fallback function for that contract will execute, causing unknown behavior
is the developer doesn’t anticipate this. The second reason is that the
developer associates a contract with the wrong address or vice versa. The
reasoning for the call to the unknown fault is similar, when the data being
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sent to the receiving address is received, the receiving contract will not
know how to interpret the data, causing the fallback function to execute.
2. Exception disorder: In Solidity and Ethereum, not all exceptions are
handled the same. Like all programs, when contract code is being
executed, there is a chance for an exception to occur. In the case of
Solidity, typically an exception will be thrown. However, it is quite
common for developers to incorrectly handle exceptions. For instance,
take the send function call in Solidity, which returns false when it fails
whereas the function transfer throws an exception on failure. When a
developer calls a contract with the send function call, there is a likely
chance that they mishandle the exception-case if they do not realize that
send is being used. Because send only returns false, a developer might not
be able to determine where the failure is happening.
3. Gasless send: There are instances where a developer might run into an outof-gas exception when they do not expect it. This unexpected exception
typically occurs when a developer is using the send function call. This
exception is thrown because the send function call is compiled down to the
call function call with an empty signature. Now, the send function call
always has a gas stipend of 2300, meaning that it only has a limited
number of instructions that can be ran before all the gas has been spent.
Now, since the signature field is empty, it will invoke the callee’s fallback
function, which may potentially have many gas-expensive instructions.
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When executing these instructions, if there are too many, then the out-ofgas exception will occur.
4. Type casts: While Solidity does perform type checking, it cannot directly
handle checking things such as addresses directly. What this means if that
if an address is cast to a contract, the only thing that Solidity does it check
the signatures of the functions of the contract that the address is being cast
to. The problem is that Solidity does not actually check to see if that
contract resides at that address. For instance, an address may cast to the
wrong contract, meaning that when the casted contract is called, it will be
highly likely that its fallback function is invoked, creating nondeterministic behavior for the developer.
5. Reentrancy: The most devastating vulnerability to date, the reentrancy
vulnerability has led to major financial devastation, such as “The DAO”
attack that caused losses of approximately $50 million [36][4] at the time
of the attack. The reentrancy attack is based on the fact that it is possible
to re-enter a non-recursive function before it is terminated. Take the
example:
contract vulnerable {
function badfunct(address addr) { //vulnerable code
addr.call.value(200)();
}
}
contract attacker {
function() { //fallback function
vulnerable(msg.sender).badfunc(this);
}
}
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In the above example, the vulnerable contract’s function badfunc,
sends the given address ether. Now, the attacker contract has its fallback
function invoked, which simply calls the same badfunc that was
previously called. This process repeats itself several times before it
eventually is stopped, but at this point too much of the ether has been
taken away. The reason that this happens is that the fallback function is
able to call the badfunc again before the execution is able to stop.
However, the much bigger problem resides in the call function. The call
function will fail during this process; however, it will not propagate the
error and as a result will not reverse the transactions that have taken place,
except for the very last transaction. Because of this vulnerability, most
developers now only use the send and transfer function calls, which are
protected against this type of attack. However, there are still instances
where a developer has no other choice than to use the call function.
6. Ether lost in transfer: When transferring ether from one address to another,
it is incredibly important that everyone knows the correct address or is
implementing their code in such a way that there is no error in getting the
correct address for sending ether. This is because ether that is sent to the
wrong address will likely be sent to an orphan address. An orphan address
is an address that does not actually exist on the blockchain. In the case of
sending ether, this means that all the ether that is sent will be lost forever
and cannot be retrieved.
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The previous faults can be mostly targeted in Solidity, however, there are faults
that are primarily concerned with just Ethereum and blockchain. These faults cannot be
directly targeted in Solidity, but rather are faults that exist because of the design of
Ethereum and blockchain in general. However, these faults are important to consider
when designing a smart contract, as the smart contract will naturally have these fault
properties associated with them. These faults are as follows:
7. Keeping Secrets: In contracts, fields can be public or private. However,
even though a field may be private, when a value is set for that field, the
transaction must be sent to miners who publish it to the public blockchain.
This allows any observers to obtain information that might lead them to
being able to figure out the value. Also, while the actual variable
information is kept private during execution, the actual contract code is
not private, as it resides on the blockchain. This allows attackers to infer
information about what may be happening in a contract and allows a white
hat approach when trying to attack an application.
8. Immutable Bugs: Once a contract is put onto the blockchain, it can no
longer be altered. This means that once the contract is on the blockchain,
if it contains bugs, there is no way to fix it. A common approach to
working around this problem is deploy the new version of a contract to a
new address and while this may work if someone is constantly being kept
up to date on the blockchain, it can leave problems for those that still use
the old version of the application. This is actually a big enough problem to
where the creators of Ethereum had to create an entire new fork in the
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blockchain because of the severity of the reentrancy vulnerability, leading
to there being two versions of Ethereum now, Ethereum and Ethereum
Classic.
9. Unpredictable State: It is impossible to determine the order that the
transactions will run for a contract. That means that if the callee invokes a
function from a contract, they cannot determine if the contract will be in
the same state that it originally was.
10. Generate Randomness: The execution of EVM bytecode is deterministic.
As with any deterministic approach to solving a problem, some
information can be inferred. This is especially relevant considering that
the blockchain is public. Any outsider can attempt to infer something
based on what is observed in the blockchain.
11. Time Constraints: Miners can choose the timestamp on a block with a
certain degree of arbitrariness. This means that the miner can determine a
timestamp that is advantageous to them. This is because many applications
use time constraints in order to determine which actions are suitable.
12. Stack Size Limit: If an attacker were to generate a nearly full-stack and
then call a victim function, then if the function does not handle exceptions
properly, can have adverse effects when the stack has ultimately reached
its limit.
A more general research study was done on the bug characteristics that exist in
blockchain systems. This research, done by Wan et al. [5], performed an empirical study
on eight blockchain platforms, including Ethereum. Wan discovered that semantic bugs
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were by far the most prevalent bugs that were found in blockchain, for instance,
Ethereum had approximately 70% of its bugs related to semantic errors. This can be
attributed to the fact that programmers were not able to understand the semantics of
blockchain. However, the bugs that took the longest to fix were related to security
vulnerabilities. Typically, security vulnerabilities are attributed to problems with the
blockchain itself. While security vulnerabilities may on average have taken longer, they
were also not as abundant as bugs such as semantic or environment related. This means
that the sample sizes were largely different, meaning that more data might reveal a better
trend for this data. If anything, this study has led the blockchain community to believe
that programmers might tend to struggle with understanding the semantics of blockchain,
causing them to introduce errors because of their lack of understanding.
Because of the error-prone nature of programmers and the risks associated with the
blockchain there have been numerous research efforts towards formalizing the way that
smart contracts should be designed. Mavridou et al. [16] proposed a FSM (Finite State
Machine) approach to generating Ethereum smart contracts. Their framework, named
FsolidM [35][39], is deigned to bridge the gap between the programmer's understanding
of the Ethereum semantics versus what the actual semantics are. As stated in the previous
research, the majority of the programming bugs that exist in blockchain applications are
related to semantic errors. This research is designed to potentially address these faults.
They claim that their framework offers clear semantics and an easy to use GUI for
developers to build a FSM that represents their program. They also provide several
plugins that allow developers to prevent common vulnerabilities that exist in Solidity
applications. Another research paper written by Grishchenko et al. [17] presented the first
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complete small-step semantics of EVM byte-code. In this research, they used the proof
assistant F* [40] to formalize their small-step semantics. Their research and formalization
led to the characterization of several security characteristics. They define these
characteristics as call integrity, atomicity, and independence from miner-controlled
parameters. The call integrity property is related to bugs such as the reentrancy or call to
the unknown, while atomicity is related to mishandled exceptions. Independence from
miner controller parameters can be split into two separate categories: independence of
mutable account state and independence of transaction environment. Independence of
mutable account state deals with bugs such as transaction order dependency and
unpredictable state, whereas independence of transaction environment deals with
timestamp dependency, time constraints, and generating randomness. These
classifications are heavily based on the fault taxonomy that was discussed previously and
provided by Atzei. The key contribution in this research paper was the actual
formalization of these semantics, which as can be seen from the previous research, is an
important area of research as the semantics of Ethereum are often not well understood.
As discussed previously, Solidity often deals with financial assets, meaning that it
is critical that security vulnerabilities are identified and fixed early. Liu et al. [18]
proposed a fuzzing approach to automatically detect reentrancy bugs in smart contracts.
In their research they created a framework ReGuard, to iteratively generate random and
diverse transactions, which they could then analyze and determine if a reentrancy attack
was present in a smart contract. ReGuard takes in the source code for a smart contract
and the output contains a report of the reentrancy bugs that were found during the
analysis. The actual workflow involves the process of transforming the contract, the
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fuzzing engine, and the core detector. Essentially, this tool will run using these
components potentially revealing if there are any reentrancy bugs, which in their
preliminary evaluation, they were able to identify seven new bugs in existing projects.
2.4 Mutation Testing
Mutation testing is a software engineering concept that has existed since the
1970’s with the concept being initially conceived by Lipton and implemented by DeMillo
et al. [11]. Mutation testing has had several advancements over the years and has been
applied to many programming languages. Mutation testing is the process of modifying
small portions of code and then running the modified code against tests. Typically, this is
thought of as purposely injecting faults into the source code. By doing this, tests will
either fail or pass while running the mutant version of the code. If all tests pass the
mutant version of the code, then the mutant is marked live, else the mutant is marked as
killed. These markings are used to calculate the mutation score. High mutation scores
indicate high quality tests because these tests are able to cover the types of faults that are
generated through mutation. Mutation testing can then be used to develop new tests,
which can target these faults. Mutation operators explain what changes will happen to the
source code when a certain attribute in the source code is found. These operators are
comprised of the relevant syntax and its possible changes that can be generated. For
instance, take the following code example. The relative operator in this example is the ‘>’
operator, which if true causes the program to return A. However, a potential mutant is to
mutate the ‘>’ operator to a ‘<’, causing the program to return B if the program was
running under the same conditions when it returned A in the original code.
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public foo(int A, int B) {
if (A > B) { // original
return A;
}
return B;
}

public foo(int A, int B) {
if (A < B) { // mutant
return A;
}
return B;
}

Typically, mutants are similar to real programming mistakes and should highlight
areas where a test suite is weak. However, there is also the potential for a valid mutant to
be created, while still being functionally equivalent to the original code. These mutants
are called equivalent and do not offer any insight into the adequacy of a test suite. These
are an expensive problem in mutation testing because they will still be tested while not
offering anything of value. There is also the problem of generating mutants based off of
the operators which are syntactically incorrect, leading the program to not compile. This
is an overhead because the incorrect mutants will still have to compile and fail the
process, however, these mutants should not count when determining the mutation score.
To address some of these issues, a research paper by Schuler et al. [27], the
JAVALANCHE framework was introduced, which uses the invariant detection engine
DAIKON [28] to help in identifying equivalent mutants. JAVALANCHE first learns the
invariants from the original program and then checks for any existing violations of those
invariants that exist in the mutants. When it comes to classification of mutants,
JAVALANCHE treats the classification slightly different. When a mutant fails a test,
then it is considered “killed”, which is typical in most mutation testing tools. However,
when a mutant is considered “live”, it is either in one of two categories: non-violating
mutants or violating mutants. Violating mutants are mutants that have passed all of the
tests, however, they violate the program invariants that were learned from DAIKON.
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These violating mutants are more likely to be considered non-equivalent mutants, since
they violate the invariant. Whereas, non-violating mutants do not violate any variant,
meaning that they do not appear to impact the program with respect to the invariants. In
their evaluation of the framework, they discuss three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is
that mutants that violate invariants are less likely to be equivalent than mutants that do
not violate invariants. In their research, they conclude that there is enough statistical
significance to support this hypothesis, however, they only worked with a small sample
size. The second hypothesis is that mutants that violate invariants are more likely to be
detected by test suites. In their evaluation, they concluded that this hypothesis was true.
For instance, in JAXEN, they detected that 98% of invariant-violating mutants are
detected versus 44% of non-violating mutants. The third hypothesis is that the more
invariants that a mutant violates, the more likely it is to be detected by tests. Again, their
evaluation supports the hypothesis, with all seven projects that were evaluated showing
that mutants with a higher number of violations resulted in better detection.
Another common problem that exists in mutation testing is the high
computational cost. Because of the extreme number of mutants that can be created for
even the simplest of operators, many iterations of running of tests can take place. Even
one small program file can result in tens to hundreds of valid mutants. Mathur [30]
originally discussed the idea of constrained mutation as an alternative to the normal way
that mutation testing had already been done. The basic idea behind constrained mutation
is to reduce the number of generated mutants, which in turn should decrease the time that
it takes to test all the mutants. The first evaluation of this approach came from Offutt et
al. [29], which used the term selective mutation to describe Mathur's approach. Typical
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mutation testing was approximated to be roughly quadratic, whereas Marthur's approach
was estimated to be approximately linear. The concept is quite similar, where we simple
remove mutation operators based on their generated number of mutants. For instance,
removing two different operators would be called 2-selective mutation. The result was
quite positive in this research, where removing the most plentiful mutation operators did
not drastically affect the mutation score, but instead improved the performance.
In the paper by DeMillo et al. [11], mutation testing was first implemented and
used to evaluate the testing methodology when considering complex errors. In this
research, the evaluation took place on providing simple-error data to the tested program.
By doing this, it was observed that simple-error data was able to kill multiple-error
mutants, essentially killing off mutants that were considered to be more complex.
According to their research, they believed that these simple techniques were effective
because of the coupling effect. Since then, mutation testing has been applied to evaluate
even more testing methodologies. Another application of mutation testing, called weak
mutation testing was described be Howden [26]. In weak mutation testing, a simple
component mutation takes place and subsequently a mutant version of that program is
created containing just the one mutated component. For example, a simple component
may include such things as arithmetic or boolean expressions. The advantage of weak
mutation testing over strong mutation testing is its ability to generalize errors, which is
due to the fact that weak mutation makes no coupling assumptions.
2.4.1 muJava
muJava [6][8] is a mutation testing tool for Java, specifically designed for the
generation of mutants that target features of object-orientation in Java. muJava generates
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mutants based on selected mutant operators and selected Java class files. Once the
mutants are generated, they are displayed to the user in such a way that the mutants can
be compared directly to the original code. While a simple feature, it is important to notify
the user the differences that exist between a mutant and the original code. Whenever a
mutant passes the test suite and is considered live, the user must be able to determine if
they need to design a new test based on the mutant or if the mutant is considered
equivalent. In muJava, it is reported that around 5-20% of the generated mutants are
considered equivalent. As mentioned previously, one of the major difficulties in mutation
testing is determining if the generated mutants are functionally equivalent to the original
program. Since the possibility of a generated mutant being equivalent is relatively high, it
is important to let the user easily be able to determine if the mutant is actually live.
While many of the programming constructs that can be mutated in Java are
relatively simple, the primary unique contribution of muJava is that it also contains
mutation operators based on class [9] and inter-class [10] programming constructs. For
instance, these mutation operators can mutate things such as the inheritance structure of
Java classes. This means that things such as overridden methods can be modified or
deleted, potentially leading to serious consequences or undefined behavior. While Java
and Solidity are quite different, muJava is an important tool in our research, as many of
the OOP mutation operators can be implemented in Solidity (given that Solidity allows
for some features of OOP).
2.4.2 Stryker
Stryker [7] is a mutation testing tool for JavaScript. We have found this tool to be
useful for our research as Solidity closely resembles and uses many of the same
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programming constructs as JavaScript. Stryker supports many traditional mutation
operators such as literal operators, arithmetic operators, assignment expressions, and
many other general operations. In addition to basic mutation operators, Stryker also
supports mutation for several of JavaScript’s popular frameworks. The major importance
of Stryker to this research project is the design of how they create the mutants. In Stryker,
the relevant code is parsed and turned into an AST. After the AST has been generated,
Stryker then traverses the AST, looking for any relevant nodes that pertain to the defined
mutation operators. When a relevant node is found, Stryker then performs the mutation,
creating a new mutant. Stryker also breaks it mutation operators into several categories.
This is done to provide clarity and to help developers differentiate the difference between
the types of operators. This design is useful for Deviant and provides great insight as to
how Deviant will approach mutation testing.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DESIGN OF DEVIANT
Chapter three discusses the design of Deviant by giving an overview, explanation
of our fault model, and a discussion of the Solidity-specific mutation operators that we
have created. Section 3.1 provides an overview as to how our application will work,
illustrating the flow of the program. Section 3.2 presents the fault model and explains the
fault types in relation to the programming constructs in Solidity. Sections 3.3 details the
mutation operators, which are the Solidity-specific mutations that are designed to
replicate the Solidity faults that were discussed in the fault model.
3.1 Overview
Deviant aims to automatically generate mutants of a given Solidity project and
run the given tests against each mutant to evaluate the testing effectiveness. Figure 3.1
illustrates the architecture of Deviant. Given a Solidity project together with test code,
Deviant selects one program file (contract, library, and/or interface) at a time, parses it
into an abstract syntax tree (AST), and applies (user-selected) mutation operators to
respective nodes of the AST to generate mutants. Mutation operators are defined
according to a comprehensive fault model of the Solidity language. In addition to the
normal fault types in traditional languages (e.g., expression in JavaScript and inheritance
in Java), our fault model considers Solidity-specific features as well as the existing
Solidity fault taxonomy mentioned in the related works. Each mutation operator
generates one or more mutants by making one change to the given AST. Each mutant is
saved into its own new file which contains the mutation.
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After all the mutants have been generated, a single mutant will be copied into the
Solidity project directory and compiled into EVM bytecode as if it were part of the
original project. The tests of the given Solidity project will then be run against the
mutated EVM bytecode. Tests will either pass or fail depending on how the mutant has
affected the functionality of the program. This process is repeated for every single mutant
that was generated by Deviant. Deviant keeps track of the test execution result of each
mutant (e.g., pass or fail) and produces a summary report on the mutation testing (e.g.,
mutation score, killed mutant count, and live mutant count). This mutation report gives
insight to the Solidity developer on the quality of their test suite. Primarily, the report can
highlight weaknesses in the developer’s suite, such as a tendency to miss covering certain
Solidity programming constructs.
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3.2 Design Challenges
3.2.1 Program Validity
A main technical issue about mutant generation is how to ensure that each mutant
is a valid program before compilation. A mutant is only considered valid if it is a contract
that can be compiled. In the case of Solidity, we have to ensure both the syntax and
semantics will pass the compiler check. The syntax is straightforward as Solidity was
designed to be similar to JavaScript. However, the implication of a syntactical change on
the semantic is often not as straightforward. There are many instances where a mutation
may seem valid at first but ends up failing compilation due to a semantic error. This of
course can cause a major performance overhead if many generated mutants are not
considered valid. In our design, we can address this issue through precondition checking
based on the semantics of Solidity language, particularly the relations between multiple
attributes and nodes in the AST. For example, Solidity libraries cannot contain payable
functions. Deviant must first check an AST node further up the tree to determine if the
function we are working with is contained in a library. A similar constraint on function
types is the view or pure function type. When applying a mutation to a view or pure
function, we have to consider what the function is modifying or reading in relation to the
state of the program. For instance, a pure function can be mutated to a view function, but
a view function cannot necessarily be mutated to a pure function since pure functions
have the extra limitation of not being able to read the state of the program. However, we
are able to determine if a view function can be modified to pure if that function itself
does not access state variables and only relies on local variables and the parameters that
are passed to the function. It can also be difficult to determine how to deal with abstract
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contracts in terms of mutation. Abstract contracts in Solidity are never deployed to the
blockchain, rather the child contracts that inherit them do. The other problem is that
abstract contracts are never directly tagged as abstract with keyword in Solidity. To
perform mutation on abstract contracts, we have to determine that at least one function in
the contract does not contain an implementation. In Deviant, we can overcome this
problem by searching the AST for a function where the body attribute is null, meaning
that there is no implementation in the function itself. Once we have done this, we can
continue to modify other function bodies through mutation operators.
3.2.2 Language Evolution
Another challenge in designing Deviant is the fact that Solidity is a constantly
evolving language. With Solidity being a relatively new language, there are going to be
many instances where Solidity features are added, removed, or changed. These changes
to the language often times affect the semantics or syntax of the language and can
ultimately change the behavior of how previously written code is executed. For example,
up until Solidity 0.4.21, constructors could be declared by using the name of the contract
as a function name. However, in the more recent versions of Solidity, the keyword
constructor must explicitly be used for the creation of a constructor. An even more
confusing Solidity change occurred with the introduction of the pure and view keywords
that could be associated with function signatures in Solidity 0.4.16. The concept of pure
and view were added to Solidity in order to be more semantically meaningful when
compared to constant, which is currently just an alias for view. However, the confusing
part of this change is that when this version came out, pure functions were not actually
functionally “pure”. This meant that while pure functions were described as being
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functions that were considered “stateless”, they were not actually enforcing this idea
completely. Pureness was eventually enforced in Solidity 0.4.17, but still created
semantic ambiguity during this time period. There are several other examples of updates
in Solidity that have changed what the code actually means.
3.2.3 Ethereum Evolution
A challenge similar to the previous is that the Ethereum blockchain always has
potential to change. As developers and researchers continue to use the Ethereum
blockchain, it becomes more likely that they will discover new faults with the current
design of the Ethereum blockchain. For example, the reentrancy attack was such a crucial
vulnerability that a hard fork of the blockchain had to occur. The hard fork in a
blockchain platform has serious effects, as it ends up changing the protocol of the
blockchain itself. In fact, the nodes that run the old non-forked version of the platform are
no longer considered valid when they attempt to make transactions. All of the nodes on
the blockchain must upgrade to the latest version of the platform if they wish to continue
to operate on the platform. This may seem as if it is a rare occurrence, but it is more
common than one may believe. In fact, as of now, there have been seven hard forks since
the inception of Ethereum. With the drastic changes that can occur in the protocol,
developers have to ensure that their smart contracts that they develop comply with the
new semantics that exist in the latest version of the EVM. Beyond the hard forks that
have taken place in Ethereum, there have also been many more soft forks that have
occurred. The difference between hard and soft forks is that in many cases nodes can
have backward compatibility when referencing the newer nodes on the blockchain.
However, in many situations these new updates to the blockchain can be quite beneficial
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to the node user, which means that they must update their own node if they wish to take
advantage of these features.
3.2.4 Reasonable Operators
Another more conceptual challenge is designing mutation operators that are
considered useful and reasonably targetable by test suites. There are an incredible amount
of mutation operators that could be created for any given programming language.
However, the challenge is designing mutation operators that are considered useful and
reasonable for the developers that use that language. In the case of Solidity, there are
several mutants that could easily be generated by Deviant if we chose to do so. However,
some of these mutants would be quite meaningless and would practically never be tested
in a real test suite as it serves no real purpose. For example, mutating the Solidity version
that is defined in the contract will almost never be useful for a developer. In most cases,
these contracts won’t even be able to compile if the versions are too different,
considering that there may be compatibility issues between the contract versions and the
Solidity compiler. This mutation is also likely to never be tested by any smart contract
developer, as these types of errors will almost always lead to a compile time error and
will actually not ever reach the point of test execution. To overcome this challenge, we
only consider the mutation operators that we believe are useful to Solidity developers.
The mutation operators that we consider useful are those that can replicate common faults
in Solidity and can create behavior in programs that can be caught by test cases.
3.2.5 Performance
A challenge that must be considered in the design of any mutation testing tool is
the challenge of performance. Mutation testing is an inherently expensive operation and
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becomes exponentially more expensive as the project’s complexity increases. For
instance, if a test suite takes approximately one minute to run all tests, then that means
that each mutant will take one minute to run the entirety of the test suite. Some mutation
operators can generate hundreds of mutants for a single program file, meaning that a test
suite must be run hundreds of times for all the mutants to be considered. One way that we
can alleviate some of this performance problem is to allow the developers to choose the
mutation operators that they wish to use during the mutation testing process. While we
consider all of the mutation operators to be useful, a developer may only really care about
certain types of mutation operators in relation to their test suite. This can be especially
useful when removing mutation operators that typically generate the most mutants. For
example, one instance of a relational operator can have several mutants involved with the
single operator. By ignoring this one mutation operator, we can potentially remove
hundreds to thousands of potential mutants across a program. Now, just simply removing
mutation operators from the list of applied operators isn’t always the best solution. We
can also reduce the number of generated mutants by limiting the number of functionally
equivalent mutants that are generated. Functionally equivalent mutants are mutants that
are syntactically valid mutants, but are functionally equivalent to the original program,
meaning that the mutant will always be considered live because it works the exact same
as the original program. As discussed in the mutation testing subsection in the
background chapter, equivalent mutants are a complicated problem that has never been
completely solved. Currently in Deviant we do not have a great answer to this problem as
well. We do not consider equivalent mutants to be part of our total number of mutants
when we consider our experimental results, but most of the methodology that has been
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considered for identifying equivalent mutants cannot be applied to our case yet. The best
solution that we have for now is to ensure that we closely follow the semantics that are
outlined in the Solidity documentation when creating our mutation operators. By doing
this, we can at least ensure that we are at least understanding the semantics of Solidity
and can avoid any potential equivalent mutants that may be generated.
3.3 Fault Model of Solidity Smart Contracts
In Deviant, each mutation operator is designed to create mutants that simulate a
certain type of faults in Solidity smart contracts. The collection of fault types implied by
all mutation operators is referred to as the fault model. The goal of Deviant is to make the
fault model as comprehensive as possible so that the generated mutants will simulate as
many types of faults as possible. It is worth pointing out that the current mutation
operators in Deviant create mutants by making only one change to the original program
(called first-order mutation operators). While such small changes may only represent
minor faults directly, the mutation testing research has shown that real bugs are often
composed of such minor faults [41].
In the following, we describe the fault model from the perspective of Solidity
program structures. Generally, a Solidity program consists of version information and
three kinds of optional modules (contract, library, and interface), as shown in the given
code snippet. Contracts and interfaces are similar to classes and interfaces in objectoriented programming (OOP) languages, respectively. A contract may inherit one or
more parent contracts or interfaces. It consists of state variable declarations, functions,
and function modifiers. While state variables and functions are comparable to instance
variables and methods in OOP, they have Solidity-specific features. In the given code
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snippet, stateAddress is an internal state variable whose type is address. foo is a payable
external function with a modifier called funcModifier. A function or function modifier is
composed of a sequence of statements which may use various expressions as in OOP
methods.
Solidity’s programming constructs in a program file are designed into four levels:
•

Inter-module: this level involves signatures of modules and relationships
among them. For example, inheritance is an inter-module level construct.

•

Intra-module: this level involves the immediate constructs within a
module. For example, intra-contract level includes state variable
declarations, signatures of functions, and signatures of function modifiers.

•

Intra-function and function modifier: this level involves individual
statements within a function (excluding functions in interfaces)

•

Intra-statement: this level involves components (e.g., expression) within a
statement (e.g., function call of assignments)
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pragma solidity 0.4.24 //version of Solidity to use
contract A is IA{
address internal stateAddress; //internal state variable of the address type
function foo() funcModifier payable external {
int memory memInt; //int variable with data location of memory
stateAddress = 0x12345; //address being assigned
msg.sender.send(10); //sends ether to the contract
msg.sender.call(0x123); //sends the bytes 0x123 to the contract
selfdestruct(stateAddress); //self-destruct and send remaining ether
...
}
modifier funcModifier() {
if (msg.sender == stateAddress) {
_; //execute the function normally if true
}
}
}
library mathLib {...}
interface IA {...}
For each level, we identify feasible faults with respect to the programming
constructs. For example, an incorrect use of inheritance is an inter-module fault (e.g., “is
IA” is removed from “contract A is IA”). Missing the reference and definition of a
function modifier in a contract is an intra-contract fault (e.g., funcModifier is removed
from the signature of foo and the definition of funcModifier is removed). Missing a
statement within a function of a contract is an intra-function-level fault (e.g.,
msg.sender.send(10) is removed from the function foo), whereas an incorrect expression
within a statement is an intra-statement level fault (e.g., 10 is changed to 1 in
msg.sender.send(10). The above classification ensures that the fault model covers the
fault types of every programming construct in Solidity.
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3.4 Mutation Operators
This section details and highlights the mutation operators that target Solidityspecific features. The mutation operators are categorized by the operator’s associated
programming construct level as was defined in our fault model. Deviant also includes
general mutation operators, meaning that these mutation operators exist in other mutation
testing tools and the programming constructs are common in other programming
languages. These general mutation operators are listed and explained in Appendix A.
3.4.1 Intra-Statement Level
Intra-statement level mutation operators are those that modify the components
within a statement. Typically, intra-statement level operators modify different types of
expressions. In regards to Solidity-specific features, these mutation operators modify
Solidity constructs such as: gas, address, address function, and data location constructs.
Gas Operators: The only mutation operators that take place on gas involve the
modification of the literal value that is associated with the gas stipend. Deviant modifies
the literal value to either a zero or random non-zero value. If the contract’s gas value is
modified, then it may cause the execution to stop either prematurely or continue on too
long. As noted previously, the out-of-gas exception is a problem that occurs in Solidity.
While this exception does not directly relate to the send function call problems that can
cause an unexpected out-of-gas exception, an insufficient gas stipend can cause an out of
gas exception for developers that don’t understand how much gas they should actually
allocate. The gas mutation operators are Modify Function Gas Value to Non-Zero
(FGVNZ) and Modify Function Gas Value to Zero (FGVZ).
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Address Operators: Address operators mutate attributes of an address variable.
Addresses in Solidity can be represented as any numerical value. However, they are
typically represented in a hexadecimal format. The modify address operators work
similarly to other numerical literal operators. They modify the actual value that the
address is being assigned to. These mutation operators can replicate faults such as type
cast error, call to the unknown, and ether lost in transfer. The type cast error and call to
the unknown can occur because the address can potentially become associated wrong
contract. This will mostly only occur however if the address still points to a valid address
that contains contract code. The ether lost in transfer is much simpler fault that can occur
from this mutation operator, considering that either a random or zero address will most
likely point to an orphaned address. The Switch Call Expression Casting (SCEC)
mutation operator is only ever applied if there are two or more instances where addresses
are being cast to different contracts. This mutation operator is more likely to cause type
cast and call to the unknown faults because the addresses in the mutant contract should
still be valid. These faults can be replicated because the SCEC operator takes two
instances of addresses being casted to different contracts and then switches the contracts
that they are being cast to, most likely causing them to point to incorrect addresses. Table
3.1 lists the address operators.
Table 3.1

Address Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Switch Call Expression Casting

Abbreviations
SCEC

Modify Address Literal to NonZero
Modify Address Literal to Zero

MALNZ
MALZ

Fault Types
Call to the Unknown
Type Casts
Ether Lost in Transfer
Call to the Unknown
Ether Lost in Transfer
Call to the Unknown
Ether Lost in Transfer
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Address Function Operators: There are several functions that are associated with
addresses, including: transfer, send, and call. In any of these cases, there is likely to be a
literal associated with the function call. It is relatively simple to modify these literal
values to any other value to create a valid mutant. These mutation operators modify the
literal argument values that are in the function call, which typically represent the amount
of ether that is sent. A potentially more dangerous fault that could exist in a smart
contract is using the incorrect address function. For instance, both the transfer and send
function calls have a gas stipend of 2,300, but differ in how they handle failure. The send
function call returns a boolean false on failure, while the transfer function call throws an
exception on failure. Even more problematic is the call function call, which does not have
the same gas stipend of 2,300. When using call.value() in place of send or transfer to send
ether, gas will continue to be spent until all of the user’s gas has been depleted. This
means that it is highly likely that the call function can use more than 2,300 units of gas if
the code execution continues on that long. Call is potentially the most dangerous out of
all the function calls because it is not considered safe against reentrancy attacks, such as
the DAO attack that was explained earlier. By swapping these function calls we can
introduce faults such as reentrancy, gasless send, or exception disorder. Reentrancy can
occur if a mutation operator replaces a send or transfer with a call function call. A gasless
send can occur if a mutation operator can occur any time that any of the address functions
are replaced by a send function call, but it will most typically happen when a transfer call
is replaced with send. An exception disorder fault will typically occur when transfer or
send are swapped. This fault will happen because if the developer was originally using
transfer, then they will not be checking to if the call is returning false, while the mutant
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version will return false instead of throwing an exception like it normally would have in
the code. Table 3.2 lists the mutation operators that target address functions.
Table 3.2

Address Function Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Modify Transfer Value
Modify Send Value
Modify Call Value
Transfer -> [ Send, Call]

Abbreviations
MDTV
MDSV
MDVC
TRS, TRC

Fault Types
Incorrect Transaction Value
Incorrect Transaction Value
Incorrect Transaction Value
Out-of-Gas Exception
Reentrancy
Exception Disorder
Send -> [Transfer, Call]
STR, SC
Reentrancy
Exception Disorder
Call -> [Transfer, Send]
CTR, CS
Out-of-Gas Exception
Exception Disorder
Data Location Operators: The data location mutation operators swap the memory
location keyword in the source code. The purpose of these mutation operators is to affect
the behavior of the variables. For instance, storage variables persist beyond the lifespan
of a function call, whereas the life span of a variable with the memory keyword is
temporary, only existing in the function that it is declared in. Also, by design storage is
quite a bit more expensive to use than memory, but this allows for storage variables to be
more dynamic. This means that data types such as arrays are automatically assigned to
the storage location to allow for dynamic usage. It is also important to note that memory
variables cannot exist outside of the lifespan of a function, meaning that global variables
cannot be declared as memory variables. Now, while these mutation operators cannot
necessarily be directly associated with the faults that were listed in the fault taxonomy, it
is quite clear that these mutation operators can severely affect the behavior of the
variables and cause unexpected behavior. The Data Location Operators are change
Storage to Memory (STRME) and change Memory to Storage (MESTR).
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3.4.2 Intra-Function Level
Function level mutation deals with the mutation of the contents within a function.
These contents include function calls, statements, or blocks, which may be comprised of
multiple function calls or statements.
Event Operators: Events can fire from the smart contracts and anything connected
to the Ethereum JSON-RPC API can listen to the events and then act. In the context of
Solidity, events are primarily used for the EVM logging facilities. When an event is
called, the arguments are stored in the transaction log, which resides in the blockchain. In
dApps, when events are fired, the JavaScript can be notified and can then act accordingly.
Of course, by applying these mutation operators, the dApp will potentially act improperly
because an event was fired when it should not have or may not fire at all. These mutation
operators will typically introduce an exception disorder fault because of the change of
behavior that the mutation operators will introduce. If the developer does not properly
test their event invocations, then it is likely that these mutants may be live when the
mutation testing takes place. The event operators are Remove Event Invocation (REI) and
Swap Event Invocations (SEI).
Selfdestruct Operators: Selfdestruct operators are essential for creating gas
efficient contracts and for when a contract is at the end of its life. Calls such as
selfdestruct (suicide is an alias to selfdestruct) send the entirety of a contract’s balance to
the address that was defined in the argument and are then subsequently destroyed at its
address. This features primarily exists to allow for the developers to destroy its own
contract when they are done with it. This is incredibly useful because of the immutability
attribute that the blockchain has, meaning that if a bug or unwanted behavior exists in the
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contract, then the developer can destroy that contract and redeploy a different one. It is
also important in terms of gas because it technically costs negative gas to execute this
function because it ultimately ends up freeing gas on the blockchain. Of course, calling
these functions unexpectedly can have major consequences, considering that it deletes the
contract code that resides at a specific address. For instance, take the example of someone
trying to send ether to this address. If the selfdestruct call has been executed
unexpectedly at this address, then the ether will be sent to an orphaned address, causing
the ether lost in transfer fault. Table 3.3 lists the selfdestruct operators.
Table 3.3

Selfdestruct Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Remove Selfdestruct Call
Insert Selfdestruct Call

Abbreviations
RSDC
ISDC

Fault Types
Exception Disorder
Ether Lost in Transfer
Exception Disorder
Remove Suicide Call
RSC
Exception Disorder
Insert Suicide Call
ISC
Ether Lost in Transfer
Exception Disorder
Exception-Handling Operators: Exception-handling is a serious problem that
exists in the EVM. As discussed earlier, exception disorder is a fault for Solidity because
the EVM does not handle all errors the same. Because of the nature of error-handling in
Solidity, exception-handling operators provide a lot of insight into a test suite’s ability to
handle exceptions. A good example of the exception ambiguity exists in the difference
between the send and transfer calls for sending ether to a contract. As explained earlier,
send only returns false on the failure, while transfer throws an exception on failure. In
some instances, a programmer might include a require statement on a send function call,
this is actually equivalent to the transfer function call. In terms of mutation, if this require
statement is removed, then an error will not be thrown and cannot be caught by the
contract that has that code. This is a subtle error, but if the exception-handling is not done
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properly, then the code may still execute because it does not catch the exception that has
occurred. Also, the revert statement can cause major problems for developers if it used
improperly. The importance of revert cannot be understated in contract development.
When something goes wrong in the execution of the contract code, it may be important to
revert all state changes that happened during the execution, which is where the revert call
comes in. The revert call reverses all the state changes, refunding all the remaining gas to
the caller. Now, if the revert statement is in the wrong place or does not even exist, then
these changes will probably not be reversed, causing some of the changes to be
permanent. The exception-handling operators target these problems by intentionally
removing or inserting these statements into areas of the code where they did not
previously reside. Table 3.4 lists the exception-handling operators.
Table 3.4

Exception-Handling Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Abbreviations
Fault Types
Remove Require Statement
RRQS
Exception Disorder
Insert Require Statement
IRQS
Exception Disorder
Remove Assert Statement
RAS
Exception Disorder
Insert Assert Statement
IAS
Exception Disorder
Remove Revert Statement
RRVS
Exception Disorder
Insert Revert Statement
IRVS
Exception Disorder
Change Function Modifier Condition (CFMC) Operator: This mutation operator
specifically targets conditions that exist inside function modifiers. Function modifiers are
attached to functions, where the function modifier will always execute before the actual
function that it is attached to does. Typically, they can be used to check preconditions
before the function execution. Now, this mutation operator modifies the conditions that
exist inside the modifier body. Specifically, the mutation operator moves the underscore
character such that it will always execute, regardless of the conditions that exist in the
modifier. This mutation operator can cause the program to have unexpected behavior
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because the state of the application will not be properly checked inside the function
modifier.
3.4.3 Intra-Module Level
State Variable Visibility Operators: These mutation operators modify the
visibility of state variables in Solidity. Unlike functions in Solidity, state variables do not
allow the external keyword. Public state variables has a generated getter function
generated when it is called. They can also be called by the internal contract or through
messages. Internal variables are similar to internal functions in that they can only be
accessed internally or through child contracts. Private variables are also similar to private
functions in that they are only visible to the internal contract and cannot be accessed by
child contracts. Visibility operators exist in many languages, however, with the nature of
Solidity, it is important to distinguish them from other operators, given the nature of the
EVM. For example, with the inclusion of the internal keyword, developers may be
confused between the semantic similarity that exists with the private keyword.
Intuitively, the two words may seem as if they are just an alias for each other. However,
the Solidity documentation clearly outlines that there is a semantic difference between the
two visibilities. If a developer is to confuse the two visibilities, it is likely that the
variable can be accessed in an unintentional manner. Table 3.5 lists the state variable
visibility mutation operators.
Table 3.5

State Variable Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Public → [Private, Internal]
Private → [Public, Internal]
Internal → [Public, Private]

Abbreviations
PUPI, PUI
PRPU, PRI
IPU, IPR

Fault Types
Loss of Visibility
Gain Excess Visibility
Loss of Visibility
Gain Excess Visibility
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Function Type Operators: The three primary function types in Solidity are pure,
view, and payable. Pure and view functions deal with how the function is allowed to
affect the state of the program. Pure functions are ultimately a subset of view functions
considering that they are essentially more restrictive in what they can access in terms of
the state of the program. Payable functions have no relation to the other two function type
keywords; however, they do serve an important purpose in Solidity. By swapping or
removing the pure/view keywords, the developer may be able to realize if they are using
the keywords incorrectly. They may also notice that a mutation may be live for either of
these types of mutations, probably indicating that they are only considering the happypath scenario for testing this function. The payable function mutation is relatively selfexplanatory, as if a test doesn’t recognize that a payable function has been modified, they
probably aren’t actually trying to send Ether to the function, which of course it the
primary purpose of the modifier keyword. Table 3.6 lists the function type mutation
operators.
Table 3.6

Function Type Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Abbreviations
Fault Types
Pure → View
PUV
Gain Readability of State
View → Pure
VPU
Lose Readability of State
Delete Pure Keyword
DPUK
Gain Control of Program State
Delete View Keyword
DVK
Gain Control of Program State
Delete Payable Keyword
DPAK
Function Cannot Receive Ether
Insert Payable Keyword
IPAK
Function Can Receive Ether
Function Visibility Operators: There are four types of function visibility in
Solidity: public, private, internal, and external. These mutation operators swap the
different function visibility keywords around. These mutation operators are useful
because of the major differences that exist between the different types of visibility. For
instance, external functions can only be called by other contracts and transactions, while
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internal functions can be called by the function it is declared in and all contracts that are
derived from it. Now, while public and private might seem semantically similar to
external and internal functions, they are not. Public functions allow for anyone to access,
this is different from external, where only outside transactions and functions can call it.
On the other hand, private functions can only be called from the contract that it is
declared in, meaning that no derived contracts can access this function. In many cases,
the mutation results that come out of these mutation operators are similar to those of the
state variable visibility operators. What is meant by this is that the mutation operators
will also give similar insight as to how the functions are being tested when compared to
the state variables. Table 3.7 lists the Function Visibility operators.
Table 3.7

Function Visibility Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Public → [Private, Internal, External]

Abbreviations
VPUPR, VPUI, VPUE

Fault Types
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
Private → [Public, Internal, External] VPRPU, VPRI, VPRE
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
Internal → [Public, Private, External] VIPU, VIPR, VIE
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
External → [Public, Private, Internal] VEPU, VEPR, VEI
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
Modifier Signature Operators: The function modifiers that exist in Solidity are
used to execute code before a function is called. Primarily, these functions are used to
check a precondition before the actual function is ran. Now, while these operators are
associated with function modifiers, they are not the same as the Chance Function
Modifier Condition operator that was explained earlier. Instead, these mutation operators
modify the modifiers that are attached to function signatures that exist in a Solidity smart
contract. This means that certain conditions will be checked that might not necessarily
have anything to do with the actual function that is being executed. In many cases, this
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may result in the function not executing or if a function modifier is removed, it could
potentially always run. Because of the unexpected behavior that this change will
introduce, there is a high probability for exception disorder to occur because of the
unchecked conditions that will ultimately take place because of the mutations.
•

Delete Function Modifier (DFM): This mutation operators deletes any modifier
argument associated with a function. This should cause the precondition check to
be ignored when the contract is running.

•

Insert Modifier on Function (IMF): In the case that there is no modifier argument
attached to a function, while a modifier still exists in a contract, a mutation can
occur where a modifier argument is attached to a function.
Library Function Visibility Operators: Libraries are an important part of the

EVM. Libraries serve a different purpose than contracts in that they are deployed once to
a specific address and then their code is reused by contracts that use the libraries. Again,
libraries contain functions with visibility modifiers, however, they function slightly
different than normal contracts. For instance, the internal keyword causes the function to
be inclined into the calling contract’s bytecode. The reason that this exists is that for
some smaller libraries, it is more efficient to compile the function inline rather than to
link the bytecode. These mutation operators are for the most part the same as the function
visibility mutation operators; however, we only include the visibility keywords that exist
for Solidity libraries. These mutation operators should ultimately give similar insight
when compared to the function visibility operators. Table 3.8 lists Library Function
Visibility operators.
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Table 3.8

Library Function Visibility Operators

Mutation Operators
Public → [Private,
Internal]
Private → [Public,
Internal]
Internal → [Public,
Private]

Abbreviations
LPUPR, LPUI
LPRPU, LPRI
LIPU, LIPR

Fault Types
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility
Gain Visibility
Lose Visibility

3.4.4 Inter-Module Level
Currently, the only mutation operator that targets the inter-module level of a
Solidity smart contract deals with multiple-inheritance. Unlike Java, Solidity supports
multiple-inheritance. There are many complicated problems that can potentially exist
with a contract that inherits multiple parents. One of the most famous problems that exist
is the diamond problem [19], where classes B and C inherit from A and then D inherits
from B and C. The reason that this is a problem is because of the same function in A is
overridden in B and C, then which version of the function will D use? In the case of
Solidity, this problem is solved by using C3 linearization [20], which is also the method
that Python uses for solving its diamond inheritance problem. Currently, the only
operator that covers multiple-inheritance is the Remove One Parent (ROP) operator,
which removes a parent from its inheritance structure. Now, this operator may cause
many potential problems. If there exist two parents in the inheritance structure which
share the same function signature, then the remaining parent after the mutation will haves
its function used instead of the other parent. This could result in the function remaining
functionally equivalent, though it is likely that the entire program will still not be
functionally equivalent. On the other hand, the function could operate quite differently.
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Determining the behavior is relatively difficult as of now but could be a potential area of
interest later on.
3.4.5 Mutation Operator Relationship to Fault Types
The fault types provided by Atzei et al. [3] and discussed in Chapter Two can be
replicated by the some of the mutation operators that were designed in Deviant. The fault
types we consider are those that can observed within Solidity code itself, namely: call to
the unknown, exception disorder, gasless send, type casts, reentrancy, and ether lost in
transfer. Table 3.9 lists these fault types along with the associated Solidity-specific
mutation operator category that can replicate these faults.
Table 3.9

Fault Types with Associated Mutation Operators

Fault Type
Call to the unknown
Exception disorder

Gasless send
Type casts
Reentrancy
Ether lost in transfer

Mutation Operator Category
Address
Address Function
Selfdestruct
Exception-Handling
Address Function
Addresses
Address Function
Address
Selfdestruct

Call to the unknown: Address mutation operators can potentially create call to the
unknown faults in Solidity. For example, if the mutated literal value that is assigned to an
address is then cast and used as a contract, then the address will no longer be correctly
pointing to the location where the contract is stored on the blockchain. If this is the case,
then when an attempt to use that contract is made, there will either be no contract at that
location or the contract that exists at that location will have its fallback function invoked.
Essentially, the developer will not be able to anticipate what will happen when that
mutated address is used.
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Exception disorder: There are three Solidity-specific mutation operator categories
that can cause an exception disorder to occur: address function, selfdestruct, and
exception-handling. Address function operators can cause an exception disorder to occur
typically when modifying between the send and transfer function calls. This is because
send returns false on failure, whereas transfer throws an exception. This means that if
there is no exception checking done on a send call, then the exception might not be
caught and the user of the Solidity application might not be aware that something went
wrong. The selfdestruct operators can either insert a selfdestruct statement or remove a
selfdestruct statement. In either case, it will cause the contract to either exist or not exist
when it shouldn’t. When this happens, a contract may attempt to use the contract that has
been incorrectly destroyed from the blockchain, causing an exception that might not
make any sense to the developer (e.g. reverting the transaction suddenly). Exceptionhandling operators either insert or remove exception-handling statements in the Solidity
smart contracts. By doing this, exceptions can either occur or not occur in the
inappropriate place. When this happens, improper exception-handling can cause the
program to behave unexpectedly. Also, by introducing exceptions in certain locations,
then gas may not be refunded.
Gasless send: Address function operators, specifically modifying transfer to send,
can cause a gasless send to occur. This is because when the send is compiled to EVM
bytecode, it is compiled to a call function with a gas stipend of 2,300. Now, since the call
function will have no signature, it will invoke the fallback function. If the fallback
function of the contract has too many executable steps, then the gas that was allocated for
the send will run out, causing an out-of-gas exception. This means that if transfer was
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able to work around this error, then by using send instead, it will cause an out-of-gas
exception to occur when it should not have.
Type casts: Type cast faults occur with the address mutation operators and are
similar to the call to the unknown faults. When a mutation operator such as the Switch
Call Expression Casting (SCEC) operator is applied, it takes two instances of addresses
being cast to a contract and then swaps them. When this occurs, it is highly likely that it
will cause a type cast error. This is because the Solidity compiler cannot check to see if
the address contains the actual contract that it is being cast to, rather it can only check the
interface of the contract itself. By swapping these contract casts, the two contracts now
point to the incorrect contract, causing the contract to have its fallback function invoked
when it is called.
Reentrancy: Reentrancy vulnerabilities can occur with address function operators,
more specifically, they can occur when either transfer or send is replaced with the call
function. The call function itself is not safe from reentrancy attacks, especially in
instances where ether is being sent. This is because unlike transfer or send, call does not
have an explicit gas stipend, rather a Solidity developer needs to include the gas stipend
themselves. When call is used instead of send or replace, code will continue executing
until either the gas runs out for the contract, or there are no more executable steps. In the
case that there is an attacker, an attacker would just simply recall the function where the
vulnerability exists. This is because when call is used to send ether to a contract, it will
invoke the receiver's fallback function, where an attacker may recall the vulnerable
function where call was used. If this happens, then the ether transaction will be repeated
until the gas runs out. Now, this will cause an exception. However, because call is being
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used, it will only revert the last transaction that took place, meaning that all the other
transactions that took place before it will be considered valid. What this means is that
when call replaces send or transfer, it can potentially introduce a reentrancy vulnerability
that allows the vulnerable contract’s non-recursive function to be entered recursively.
Ether lost in transfer: Ether lost in transfer faults can happen when an address or
selfdestruct mutation operator is applied. When an address mutation operator modifies
the literal value that is associated with an address, that address will likely point to an
address that contains nothing at that location. When a contract attempts to send ether to
this address, it will cause an ether lost in transfer fault. This is because that ether will be
sent to an orphaned address (nothing exists at that address) and the ether will not be
recoverable. When a selfdestruct insert mutation operator is applied, it will cause the
contract to be destroyed when it is executed. When this happens, any time that a contract
attempts to send ether to the address where to contract used to be, it will end up being
lost. This is because that address is no longer valid as the contract can no longer be
invoked at that address. The ether then becomes lost and is unrecoverable.
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CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLEMENTATION
Chapter Four explains our implementation of Deviant. Section 4.1 details our
implementation of the Deviant application, discussing both the Graphical User Interface
(GUI) and explaining how we have implemented our architecture in relation to our design
in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 addresses the implementation issues that were faced in Deviant.
4.1 Implementation of Deviant
Deviant provides an easy-to-use Graphical User Interface (GUI) for developers.
The main purpose of the GUI is to provide organized and meaningful information to the
user in an intuitive manner. The GUI itself is implemented using Electron, which is a
NodeJS framework that allows for developers to create GUIs in a similar manner to web
pages. Much of the styling is done using bootstrap, considering that bootstrap is widely
used and removes much of the hassle that is required to manually style the HTML pages.
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Figure 4.1

Home Page for Deviant GUI

As seen in Figure 4.1, the Deviant GUI allows the user to select the relevant
Solidity project directory for mutation. After selecting the project, the user can then
choose which Solidity files they wish to use for mutation. On the homepage, we include
four buttons: Select Mutation Operators, Generate Mutants, Run Tests, and View Report.
The user first must select the mutation operators as seen in Figure 4.2, which afterwards
they can then generate the mutants. After the mutants have been generated, the user can
then proceed to the run the tests. Finally, once the tests have finished executing, the user
can then view the report.
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Figure 4.2

Mutation Operators Page for Deviant GUI

The mutant operators in the GUI are divided into their respective categories:
statement/expression level, function level, intra-module level, and inter-module level as
seen in Figure 4.2. We have divided the mutation operators into their respective
categories to allow the developers to consider which mutation operators they find most
important during their own evaluation. In most instances, a developer does not need to
include every mutation operator that is available, rather they only want to include a select
few that are of interest to them.
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Figure 4.3

Report Page for Deviant GUI

The report page, as seen in Figure 4.3, allows the developer to select the original
file from the project that was selected, along with a mutant file that they wish to compare
to the original. The report will display the line where the mutation occurred, along with
the line number in code where the mutation took place. The bottom section of the report
displays the total number of mutants for the selected file, along with the number of killed
mutants, live mutants, and mutation score. The report also includes the most common live
mutant type along with the most common generated mutant type. It should be noted that
the report page does not automatically determine if a mutant is functionally equivalent to
the original program. Deviant cannot automatically determine equivalent mutants, instead
the developer must evaluate the generated mutant and determine if the mutant is
equivalent to their program. This means that the number of live mutants reported on the
report page may be incorrect with relation to the equivalent mutants.
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Deviant is implemented using JavaScript with NodeJS. JavaScript was selected as
the primary language for two reasons: the available libraries that exist for the
modification of Solidity source code and the overall support that exists for NodeJS in
regards to Solidity. In fact, most of the dApps that are written with Solidity also use a
NodeJS portion for things such as its front-end or event-handling. Using NodeJS is also
incredibly useful for this project, considering that the Solidity language itself is heavily
influenced by JavaScript and shared much of the same syntax and other features.
Beyond the programming language, Deviant primarily uses two libraries to
modify the Solidity source code, solparse [13] and solmeister [14]. Solparse takes in the
Solidity code as input, parses the code, and then outputs an AST (Abstract Syntax Tree)
based on the Solidity contract. This AST is represented in the JSON (JavaScript Object
Notation) format as seen in the below JSON snippet, which allows for easy traversal and
is fairly straightforward to modify. Deviant then uses solmeister to traverse the AST,
looking for tree nodes that are relevant to mutation operators. When a relevant node is
found, then the mutation operator is applied, and a new mutant AST is created. In this
case, there exists only one change per mutant. After the mutant AST has been created,
solmeister has the ability to generate source code based off the mutant AST. The newly
generated source code is then written to file and stored in a mutant project directory that
contains all other mutants for the project. Referring again to the JSON snippet below, we
can see an individual node that is part of a Solidity smart contract. In this example,
highlighted in red, Deviant would modify the operator value in the node from ‘<’ to
another relational operator such as ‘>’ ,’ >=’, ‘<=’, ‘==’, or ‘!=’.
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"type": "IfStatement",
"test": {
"type": "BinaryExpression",
"operator": "<",
"left": {
"type": "MemberExpression",
"object": {
"type": "Identifier",
"name": "balances",
"start": 601,
"end": 609
},
"property": {
"type": "MemberExpression",
"object": {
"type": "Identifier",
"name": "msg",
"start": 610,
"end": 613
},
"property": {
"type": "Identifier",
"name": "sender",
"start": 614,
"end": 620
},
"computed": false,
"start": 610,
"end": 620
},
"computed": true,
"start": 601,
"end": 621
},
"right": {
"type": "Identifier",
"name": "amount",
"start": 624,
"end": 630
},
"start": 601,
"end": 630
}
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After all of the mutants have been generated, Deviant then runs the test suites
against the mutant versions of the Solidity program files. Truffle is a popular
development environment, testing framework, and asset pipeline for Ethereum [15].
Deviant requires that the provided Solidity projects are developed using the Truffle
environment, which for most Solidity projects, is already the case. The reason that
Deviant requires Truffle is primarily for automation purposes, without Truffle, the
process of mutation testing would be quite cumbersome. Truffle provides a systematic
approach to testing smart contracts, while also being the most popular development
environment for Solidity. What Deviant actually does with the Truffle project is to
actually run the test command for Truffle, while making sure that the appropriate mutant
is being compiled instead of the original source code.
Truffle’s testing phase always starts out with the contracts being recompiled. In
our case, we insert the mutant into the project’s contract directory and ensure that the
mutant is compiled while the original source code is ignored. This process is repeated
until every mutant has been ran against the entirety of the test suite, meaning that only
mutant is used at a time. Deviant tracks these mutants and then reports the evaluation
metrics to the user.
4.2 Implementation Issues
There are many implementation challenges that occur during the development
process of a mutation tool for a relatively new programming language. Many of these
implementation challenges relate closely to the design challenges that were mentioned in
the overview subsection of Chapter 3. In relation to the constant changes that take place
to the Solidity language itself, developers have to be aware of the changes and how they
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affect the current implementation of their program, ours included. The most noticeable
changes in our development process was the syntactic and semantic differences that
existed between the different Solidity versions. As explained in Chapter 3, until Solidity
4.24, the constructor in the contract was implemented by using the name of the contract
as the function name, whereas it is now defined by using the constructor keyword. In
terms of implementation challenges, if a developer were using an earlier version of
Solidity, then their old contracts will no longer be compiled by the newer version of the
Solidity compiler. To fix this, developers have to ensure that their implementation
follows the appropriate syntactic rules in relation to the version of the Solidity compiler
that they are using. In our case, this means that we only support Solidity versions that are
great than 0.4.0, which for almost all projects should not be an issue. While this
individual change may be small, there are numerous changes that occur between the
different Solidity versions.
In any mutation testing tool, there may be a possibility to generate an invalid
mutant. An invalid mutant is a mutant that does not compile. In our implementation, there
are several instances where an invalid mutant may be generated. This issue is related
directly to the design challenge mentioned in Chapter Three about the generate of invalid
mutants. If we do not consider this problem, then the mutation testing performance will
be severely hindered. This is because for every mutant that is generated and considered
invalid, will still have to fail its compilation, ultimately costing time. To bypass this
problem, we implement extensive precondition checking of the AST according to the
Solidity documentation. This means that every time that we encounter a potential node,
we have to evaluate several attributes that may exist in the node. If these attributes are not
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what we expect, then we do not create the mutation at that point. However, there are still
instances where an invalid mutant could be generated. In our application, we have
implemented a check that looks for compile-time errors and if one exists, we consider
that mutant to be invalid and it is no longer considered in our report.
The constant updates to Solidity not only affect the syntax and semantics of the
programming language, but they also affect many of the libraries that are useful for our
mutation tool. For instance, the solmeister library that we use has not been updated since
2016, having several new versions of Solidity come out since then. To overcome this
problem, we had to modify the project’s own dependencies to ensure that its own
libraries are updated to work with the appropriate version of Solidity. It is quite fortunate
that the fix was this simple, but for most libraries this will not be an appropriate solution.
In many cases, abandoned libraries might have to be retooled to work for the developer
that is using them or they may have to give up on the library completely. Thankfully, our
situation relies on libraries that are not overly-complicated and can be easily fixed in the
future if we need to.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this chapter we detail our empirical evaluation. Section 5.1 gives an overview
of our experiment, providing details and metrics about our subject program along with
providing the results from our experiment. Section 5.2 analyzes the results from our
experiment.
5.1 Experiment
To evaluate the effectiveness of Deviant, we used the following Solidity
applications that cover the main Solidity features:
•

MetaCoin [22] : MetaCoin is part of a popular collection of Solidity smart
contracts in the Truffle Box repository. MetaCoin is a boilerplate for the creation
of a coin in Solidity.

•

MultiSig Wallet [23]: The MultiSig Wallet is a popular implementation of multisignature wallets for Ethereum. Multi-signature wallets are primarily used
because they require multiple parties to sign before transactions are executed.

•

Alice [21]: Alice is a social impact platform build on top of Ethereum. The unique
aspect of Alice is that these social projects are ran transparently. The goal of this
project is to allow organizations to identify and scale projects according to their
performance.

•

AragonOS [24] : aragonOS is a framework that can be used to develop dApps,
protocols, and decentralized organizations. Specifically, aragonOS adds a layer of
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abstraction for managing resources when creating decentralized organizations and
protocols.
•

OpenZeppelin [25]: OpenZeppelin is one of the most popular Solidity libraries on
GitHub for secure smart contract development. OpenZeppelin provides many
implementations of common Solidity components and standards that are used by
the Solidity developer community.
Table 5.1 details the metrics of the subject program. All of them have much more

test code than the production code. The tests for MetaCoin have achieved 100% and 50%
of statement coverage and branch coverage of the production, respectively. For MultiSig
Wallet, the statement and branch coverage reached 100%. The tests for Alice have not
reached full statement coverage mostly because of exception handling code, which is not
exercised unless the exceptions are triggers. The tests of aragonOS have reached almost
complete statement and branch coverage. The tests of OpenZeppelin have achieved both
100% coverage for both statement and branch coverage based on coverage of relevant
lines of code. The tests of MultiSig Wallet have achieved 100% statement and 100%
branch coverage. We have retrieved the coverage statistics for aragonOS and
OpenZeppelin from coveralls [42] as part of their continuous integration, while we
retrieved the coverage results for Alice, MetaCoin, and MultiSig Wallet from soliditycoverage [43].
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Table 5.1
Subject
Program

Subject Program Metrics
Production
Code
(LOC)
29
501

#
Contracts

Test
Code
(LOC)
71
673

# Tests

Statement
Coverage

Branch
Coverage

MetaCoin
2
4
100
50
MultiSig
7
9
100
100
Wallet
Alice
1,040
22
1,852
129
86.25
59.09
aragonOS
2,492
43
3,840
549
99.79
98.85
OpenZeppelin
6,085
133
7,861
2188
100
100
The experiments were performed on several different machines. The first machine
is a Lenovo T430 laptop, the second a Boise State provided workstation, and the third is a
PC with 32 GB of RAM and an i7 6700k at 4.6 GHz. For each subject program, we first
generate the mutants of the program, run the tests against all mutants, remove live
equivalent mutants, and report mutation scores. In the experiments, both contracts in
MetaCoin are mutated with all operators. For MultiSig Wallet, we have generated
mutation operators for all 7 of the contracts, including both Solidity-specific and
traditional mutation operators. Of the 22 contracts in Alice, 19 are meaningful and
applicable. They are mutated by all operators. Due to the complexity of aragonOS and
time-consuming of the mutation testing, currently we have applied mutation testing to 32
of the 43 (considering only the meaningful and applicable modules) contracts in
aragonOS, only generating the Solidity-specific mutation operators. For reasons similar
to aragonOS, we have only generated Solidity-specific mutants for OpenZeppelin,
targeting 16 of the 133 Solidity files. In OpenZeppelin, we specifically targeted larger
program files that contained many of the unique Solidity features that we aimed to target
for our evaluation. Table 5.2 lists the subject programs and the contracts that were
selected for mutation in our experiment.
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Table 5.2

Subject Programs and Their Contracts Used for Mutation
Subject Program

MetaCoin
MultiSig Wallet

Alice

aragonOS

Solidity Files
MetaCoin.sol
ConverLib.sol
Factory.sol
MultiSigWallet.sol
MultiSigWalletFactory.sol
MultiSigWalletWithDailyLimit.sol
MultiSigWalletWithDailyLimitFactory.sol
TestCalls.sol
TestToken.sol
AliceToken.sol
Coupon.sol
CuratedTransfers.sol
CuratedWithWarnings.sol
DigitalEURToken.sol
DigitalGBPToken.sol
DonationWallet.sol
Escapable.sol
FlexibleImpactLinker.sol
MockValidation.sol
MoratoriumTransfers.sol
OffChainImpactLinker.sol
OwnableWithRecovery.sol
Privileged.sol
Project.sol
ProjectWithBonds.sol
ACL.sol
ACLSyntaxSugar.sol
APMNamehash.sol
APMRegistry.sol
AppProxyBase.sol
AppProxyPinned.sol
AppProxyUpgradeable.sol
AppStorage.sol
AragonApp.sol
BaseEVMScriptExecutor.sol CallsScript.sol
DAOFactory.sol
ENSConstants.sol
ENSSubdomainRegistrar.sol
ERC20.sol
EtherTokenConstant.sol
EVMScriptRegistry.sol
EVMScriptRunner.sol
Initializable.sol
Kernel.sol
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OpenZeppelin

KernelConstants.sol
Repo.sol
SafeMath64.sol
ScriptHelpers.sol
TimeHelpers.sol
Uint256Helpers.sol
UnsafeAragonApp.sol
VaultRecoverable.sol
Autopetrified.sol
DelegateProxy.sol
Petrifiable.sol
UnstructuredStorage.sol
ECDSA.sol
ERC165.sol
ERC165Checker.sol
ERC1820Implementer.sol
ERC721.sol
ERC777SenderRecipientMock.sol
ERC20.sol
Pausable.sol
ReentrancyAttack.sol
ReentrancyMock.sol
PaymentSplitter.sol
Roles.sol
SignerRoleMock.sol
StringsMock.sol
WhitelistAdminRole.sol
WhitelistedRole.sol

Table 5.3 shows the experimental results including the potential equivalent
mutants. We were not able to manually check every mutant that was generated to
determine if it was functionally equivalent to the original program, as doing so with such
a large number of mutants would be incredibly time consuming. However, for the
Solidity applications MetaCoin and MultiSig Wallet, we were able to manually check the
generated mutants and determine which ones were considered equivalent. The mutation
scores of Solidity-specific features of all subject programs are very low (36.36%69.70%). This indicates that the existing tests are unable to reveal the majority of faults
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Solidity-specific programming constructs although they have covered almost all
statements (or even all branches in aragonOS and OpenZeppelin). As such, we believe
that a test suite adequate for the statement and branch coverage of Solidity programs does
not necessarily provide a high-level assurance of code quality.
Table 5.3

Subject Program Experimental Results Including Potential
Equivalent Mutants

Subject
Program

#
Mutation
Total
Contracts
Method
Mutants
Mutated
MetaCoin
2
All operators
44
Solidity11
specific features
MultiSigWalle
7
All operators
639
t
Solidity220
specific features
Alice
19
All operators
1,057
Solidity431
specific
features
aragonOS
32
Solidity793
specific
features
OpenZeppelin
22
Solidity439
specific
features

# Killed Mutants

Mutation
Score

29
4

65.91%
36.36%

145
128

22.59%
58.18%

570
165

53.93%
38.28%

355

44.77%

306

69.70%

We found that there were no equivalent mutants generated for the MetaCoin
project, while the MultiSig Wallet project had 45 generated equivalent mutants. This led
to MultiSig Wallet killing 145 out of all 594 mutants and killing128 out of 220 Solidityspecific mutants, receiving a Mutation score of 24.41% and 58.18% respectively. For
these two subject programs, we noticed that removing the equivalent mutants did not
affect the mutation score heavily.
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5.2 Analysis
In our experimental evaluation, our subject programs had relatively low mutation
scores. These low mutation scores indicate that the provided test suites are not very
adequate at addressing common faults and vulnerabilities that exist in Solidity. We have
also noticed that some mutant types are much more likely to be considered live than
others. In Table 5.4, the subject programs are presented with the number of live mutants
for each mutant type of Solidity-specific features. The total number of live mutants in
Table 5.4 is equal to the number of total mutants minus the number of killed mutants
from Table 5.3. According to our results, there are clearly some mutants that are killed
less often than others. In this section, we discuss the mutant types in relation to our
experiment and provide analysis as to why some of these live mutants are so prevalent.
Table 5.4

Number of Live Mutants for each Mutant Type of Solidity-Specific
Features

Gas
Address
Address Function
Data Location
Event
Selfdestruct
Exception-Handling
Modifier
Function Type
Function Visibility
Library Function
Visibility
State Variable
Visibility
Total

MetaCoin

MultiSig Wallet

Alice

aragonOS

OpenZeppelin

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
2
1

0
0
0
0
0
13
36
13
10
0
0

0
0
0
0
24
26
46
50
4
67
0

0
0
1
3
6
32
94
10
45
109
4

0
0
2
0
3
6
61
10
4
0
0

0

20

49

134

43

7

92

276

448

143
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5.2.1 Gas Mutants
Considering that the gas operators only involved the mutation of the literal value
that were passed to the gas call, these mutants were killed quite easily. As seen in our
results, not a single gas mutant was marked as live in our experiment. Since the Ethereum
platform introduced gas as a concept to limit the number of executable steps before the
termination of a program, the mutations would just often times cause the program
execution to terminate prematurely, causing exceptions to be propagated to other parts of
the program quite quickly. In any case, the test cases that were provided were able to
catch the exceptions that were thrown by the out-of-gas exceptions caused by the gas
mutants.
5.2.2 Address Mutants
Address operators deal with the mutation of the address type. This either mutated
the address literal or mutated the contract that the address was being cast to. In both
cases, the mutants were always killed throughout our experiment. Modifying the address
that are associated with a contract would have drastic effects on the program behavior.
Considering that if a contract is pointing to the wrong address, when it is used, it will
likely just invoke the fallback function. Now, if this happens, the program execution
should break and the test suite will most likely catch this, as an unexpected exception
should typically occur and propagate through the program. This means that each of the
test suites that were evaluated were able to successfully kill the mutants that were
generated.
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5.2.3 Address Function Mutants
The number of generated address function mutants are not high in relation to
some of the other mutants. This makes sense as send, transfer, or call functions are
typically not prevalent throughout a Solidity project. Many of the address function
mutants that were generated were marked as live during our experiment. In almost all
instances, swapping between send, transfer, and call will not result in any major
functional differences between the mutant and the original program version. However,
the key difference as stated in the operator description is how each of these functions
operate when an error-condition has been met. It is most likely the case that developers
are not testing malicious or faulty scenarios when using transfer, send, or call. For
instance, the major difference between send and transfer is that transfer throws an
exception when failure has occurred while send returns false on failure. If failure never
happens during the test suite, it makes sense as to why these mutants will not be detected.
In our case, the reachability of this error-condition can be hard to achieve. In a test suite,
it may not be feasible to attempt to cause a failure on send or transfer. For example, if
attempting to get an out-of-gas exception while using send, it would require the developer
to write extra and unnecessary code in their fallback function. This is not reasonable for
most developers as extra code being written in the fallback function is considered a waste
and costs extra gas. It is also important to note that in our experiments there are not many
instances where Ether is being transferred. Most of our applications that were used are
not heavy-financial applications, meaning that the instances of Ether transfer are fairly
limited. Even if the applications were mostly financial, it wouldn’t make sense for there
to be an abundance of transfer calls. Including too many instances of transfer or send
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calls would most likely cause the design of the application to be overly complicated or
redundant. In any case, these mutants were typically almost never killed by the
applications in our experiment even with the low number of generated mutants.
5.2.4 Data Location Mutants
The data location mutants were split based on if the mutant switched storage to
memory or memory to storage. Storage to memory mutants were mostly considered live
during our experiment. This is most likely due to the fact that the changes do not
propagate heavily throughout the program. For instance, the original version of the
program would have had the storage variable pointing to a state variable. If this is the
case, when the assignment is made when the mutant is a memory variable, it will cause
that change to just be localized to within the scope of the function. This would likely not
cause any drastic changes to the program’s behavior. However, the memory to storage
mutants were almost always killed. This is most likely because when a variable is
declared as storage in the scope of a function, it will by default point to the state variables
defined in the contract. Of course, if this value is overwritten because of this change, it
will cause changes that propagate throughout the program. This means that there are
several instances where the change can be caught by the test suite.
5.2.5 Event Mutants
Event mutants in most cases were killed, but in some situations were still live.
Considering that events are typically used for EVM logging facilities and the JavaScript
portion of the dApp it makes sense that sometimes events may be overlooked in a test
suite. This is not necessarily just a problem in Solidity. In many cases, some events are
triggered only in exceptional circumstances, meaning that the conditions for the events to
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be triggered cannot be easily determined by the developers. In these cases, it makes sense
as to why these events would not be triggered, considering the difficulty of actually being
able to target the event invocation. This means that in some cases, the event mutations are
not reachable by the provided test suite. It can also be the case that the test suite does not
correctly check the state of the program after the execution of the mutated statement.
Take the following code snippet:
function investFromWallet(uint _amount) public {
require(getToken().transferFrom(msg.sender, beneficiaryAddress, _amount));
uint256 couponCount = _amount.div(couponNominalPrice);
coupon.mint(msg.sender, couponCount);
liability = liability.add(getPriceWithInterests(_amount));
//emit CouponIssuedEvent(msg.sender, couponCount);
}

By removing the event invocation (commenting it out in the code), any event listeners
will not catch that the event should have been invoked. When a test suite cannot detect
this mutant, it suggests that it does not meet the necessity requirements, indicating that it
does not check the state of the program immediately after the statement has been
executed.
5.2.6 Selfdestruct Mutants
In our experiment, selfdestruct mutants were killed most of the time. However,
there were more instances of live mutants than we were expecting. Now, we had
originally assumed that selfdestruct mutants would almost always be killed, but there are
actually a few reasons why mutants might still be live. For instance, if a selfdestruct
mutant contains an insertion of a selfdestruct statement, then the contract will be
destroyed if it is executed. Now, if this happens with a mutant while testing, then if the
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contract is used again, it is highly likely that the mutant will be killed. However, if the
contract is never called or used again, then there is a chance that the mutant will not be
detected and considered live. Developers are typically not going to check for instances
where a selfdestruct call may be executed, especially if the selfdestruct call was never in
the function or contract to begin with. This is an interesting mutant because it is hard to
determine the reasonability of actually testing for this situation. On the other hand, if a
selfdestruct call is removed from a function, then the contract will still exist. When these
mutants are considered live, we assume that it is live because the test suite never attempts
to use the contract again, making an assumption that the contract was destroyed
successfully. In any live insert selfdestruct statement (e.g. selfdestruct(address(0x123)));
the program state will change drastically right after the program has finished executing
and should affect the ending program state as well. This indicates that live mutants that
cannot detect the selfdestruct mutants do not reach the necessity or sufficiency
requirements of testing. This is because the test suite does not correctly check the state of
the program immediately after executing the selfdestruct (or when it is removed) and at
the end of all execution.
5.2.7 Exception-Handling Mutants
Exception-handling mutants were quite prevalent throughout our experiment.
When inserting an exception statement into the contract code, it likely will cause an error
to be thrown in an unexpected spot during the program execution. This exception should
propagate to the test suite most of the time and should be easily detectable by the test
suite in most instances. However, like the event-handling mutation operators, there are
many instances where it is unusual for an exception statement to be reached. These
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instances most often cannot be easily targeted by developers in a test suite and are just
rather inserted there in case of extreme circumstances. We believe that this is the
reasoning as to why there are so many live mutants of this type. Take the example
exception-handling statement: require(msg.sender == validatorAddress);. In Deviant, a
delete mutation operator would be applied to this statement, causing the condition to
never be checked. When this mutant is live, it suggests that the test suite only assumes the
happy-path scenario, meaning that it does not meet the necessity requirements, ignoring
the state of the program immediately after the mutated statement has executed (or in this
case not been executed).
5.2.8 Modifier Mutants
We also received surprising results with our modifier mutants. Typically, it would
make sense for preconditions to be checked by tests. As modifiers tend to be focused on
checking preconditions before the execution of a function, we would have believed the
number of live mutants for this mutant type to be much smaller. However, we believe
that developers are either considering only the happy-path scenario or the state that
causes the modifier to fail is hard to achieve. For example, if a modifier checks to see if
the address of the function callee is correct (e.g. if(msg.sender == correctAddress)), then
it may be likely that the test suite never attempts to call the function from an invalid
address. This could imply that the reachability of the “false” branch is hard to reach in the
modifier function, indicating that removing the modifier will not drastically affect the
program while it is running in the test suite. However, if the test suite does attempt to use
an incorrect address, it would likely cause an exception somewhere in the program,
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causing a test case to fail. In our case, it does not seem to be highly-likely that this will
happen.
5.2.9 Function Type Mutants
Again, our expectations were different from the actual results that we received
from these mutant types. In our evaluation, we noticed that the live mutants typically
existed when the function types that were originally implemented might have either been
designed improperly or are just hard to test. For instance, pure functions are considered to
be a subset of view functions. This is because view functions can read the state of the
program, but not modify it. However, it is not enforced that a view function read the state
of the program. This means that a pure function, which cannot read or modify state, can
be modified to a view function without error. This situation is hard to test and does not
provide much functional difference. However, we consider the state of the program to be
different with this applied mutation, that is because the function can still read from state
when the original program did not intend to. Our deleted payable mutants were live
primarily if a test suite did not attempt to send ether to that function. This is because a
function cannot receive ether if it does not have the payable keyword attached to it. When
transfer or send attempts to send ether to a non-payable function it will fail. However, if a
contract was using send and did not do proper exception-handling, then it possibly may
lead to the mutant being considered live.
5.2.10 Function Visibility Mutants
The results for the function visibility mutants were often mixed. In most cases, if
the visibility of the original function versus the mutant were semantically different, it
would in most cases cause an exception that would propagate to the test suite. These
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mutants were almost always marked as killed during the experiment. However, if the
visibility was semantically similar (e.g. internal and private), then the mutants would
often times be considered live. For example, if a function is modified from public to
external and then is only called externally by the test suite, then this mutant will be
marked as live. These results primarily indicate one thing about the test suites that were
provided: that the test suites do not directly test the visibility of functions. Most of the
time when the mutants were killed, it wasn’t directly because the function visibility was
being tested, it was rather that the function could no longer be called from the correct
context. It makes sense as to why this would not often be tested as much as some of the
other programming constructs, considering that the effort of testing the visibility would
require extra effort and typically isn’t related to the typical workflow of the application.
5.2.11 Library Function Visibility Mutants
The results of the library function visibility mutants were practically identical to
the function visibility mutants that were discussed above. This makes sense as the
semantics of the visibilities between libraries and contracts are hardly different, rather
just libraries are slightly more limited. Of course, are numbers show the number of live
mutants were much lower, but this is simply because the number of generated mutants for
libraries were much smaller. This is because the actual number of libraries in an
application tended to be much smaller when compared to the overall number of Solidity
smart contracts.
5.2.12 State Variable Visibility Mutants
Again, the results of the state variable visibility mutants were practically identical
to the other visibility mutants. There were a high number of live mutants in this case, but
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as explained earlier, the semantic difference between the visibilities can be hard to test in
a test suite. It is uncommon for developers to introduce tests that directly target accessing
state variables, just as it is uncommon for developers to introduce tests that target the
visibility of functions.
5.3 Threats to Validity
In any software engineering related experiment, there are several threats to
validity that must be considered and addressed. This subsection gives an overview of
three threats to validity of our experiment, namely: external, internal, and construct. We
also explain how we address these threats and explain our decision-making process.
External: An external threat would be that our experiment did not cover realworld Solidity applications. For our evaluation, we experimented on five subject
programs. We determined our subject programs based on complexity (lines of code),
popularity, and type of application. By considering these attributes, we are able to cover a
variety of programs that represent the different types of applications that can be built in
Solidity, along with covering the features that are unique to Solidity and Ethereum.
Internal: A potential threat to the validity of our experiment is that our own tool
may have faults. We have addressed this threat by using well-known and commonly
adopted libraries that are used by the Solidity developer community. We have also taken
into consideration the mutants that do not successfully compile. These mutants are
considered invalid and ultimately do not count towards our experimental results.
Construct: A threat to the construct of our experiment is that our test does not
accurately measure what we are claiming. To address this threat, we have primarily
focused on testing the Solidity feature, as that is the primary contribution of our research.
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On our subject programs that are smaller in scale, we have used all available mutation
operators and have mutated every Solidity file in the project. For our larger scale
(aragonOS and OpenZeppelin) projects, we focused only on using the unique Solidity
mutation operators. We only used these mutation operators because of the performance
overhead to run these test suites and to ensure that we could get enough experimental
data for our Solidity mutation operators. For OpenZeppelin, we selected Solidity program
files based on the unique Solidity program constructs that existed in the project. Again,
we did this because of the performance overhead of running a large project’s test suite
repeatedly (in our case 439 times)
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
We have presented our mutation testing tool, Deviant, for Solidity smart
contracts. Our mutation testing tool is designed to target the unique features of Solidity,
taking into consideration the design of the Ethereum blockchain. We have also
implemented many of the traditional mutation operators that exist in other programming
language’s mutation testing tools.
We have applied our mutation testing tool to five different open-source Solidity
projects with varying complexity. We have determined that in each of these Solidity
projects, the test suites that were provided are not adequate enough according to the
mutation scores that they received. We have also done preliminary analysis as to why
some types of live mutants are more prevalent. In most cases, we believe that these
common live mutants typically exist because of the difficulty of testing certain
programming constructs or because the developers make assumptions about the state of
the contracts that have been used.
For future work, we want to do an in-depth analysis as to what tests can kill
certain types of mutants in Solidity. We will be using the generated mutants from this
experiment to evaluate the mutants themselves to further understand why these mutants
are being missed by the test cases. We can then manually generate test cases that target
these live mutants. By doing this, we can determine what test cases can kill certain types
of mutants.
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A.1 General Intra-Statement Level Mutation Operators
Beyond the Solidity-specific mutation operators that were discussed, we have
implemented several other traditional mutation operators. These mutation operators were
inspired or based off of mutation operators from Styker[7] and muJava[6].
Binary Expression Operators: Binary expressions consist of two operands and
one operator. For mutation purposes, we only consider the operator itself in binary
expressions as the operands themselves tend to be literal or variables that will be handled
by other mutation operators. These mutation operators are quite simple, but do in fact
represent many common programming mistakes as they often represent minor logical or
arithmetic errors. Also, these mutation operators tend to generate many mutants when
compared to some of the other mutation operators. That is because for each instance of a
binary expression, there are usually several valid mutation operators that can applied to
an individual. It is also because binary expressions tend to be quite plentiful in
programming. Table A.1 lists the binary mutation operators that are implemented in
Deviant.
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Table A.1

Binary Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators

Abbreviations

Fault Types

+ → [-, *, /, %]
- → [+, *, /, %]

PTMN, PTMU, PTD, PTMD
Arithmetic Error
MNTP,
MNTMU,
MNTD, Arithmetic Error
MNTMO
* → [+, -, /, %]
MUTP,
MUTMN,
MUTD, Arithmetic Error
MUTMO
/ → [+, -, *, %]
DTP, DTMN, DTMU, DTMO
Arithmetic Error
% → [+, -, *, /]
MOTP, MOTMN, MOTMU, Arithmetic Error
MOTD
< → [>, <= , >=, ==, !=] LTGT, LTLTE, LTGTE, LTE, Conditional Error
LTNE
> → [<, <= , >=, ==, !=] GTLT, GTLTE, GTGTE, GTE, Conditional Error
GTNE
<= → [>, < , >=, ==, !=] LTEGT, LTELT, LTEGTE, Conditional Error
LTEE, LTENE
>= → [>, <= , <, ==, !=] GTEGT, GTELTE, GTELT, Conditional Error
GTEE, GTENE
== → [>, <= , >=, <, !=] EGT, ELTE, EGTE, ELT, ENE
Conditional Error
!= →[>, <= , >=, ==, <] NEGT, NELTE, NEGTE, NEE, Conditional Error
NELT
&& → ||
AOR
Conditional Error
|| → &&
ORA
Conditional Error
& → [|, ^]
BABOR, BAXOR
Binary Arithmetic Error
| → [&, ^]
BORBA, BORXOR
Binary Arithmetic Error
^ → [&, |]
XORBA, XORBOR
Binary Arithmetic Error
<< → >>
LSRS
Binary Arithmetic Error
>> → <<
RSLS
Binary Arithmetic Error
Unary Expression Operators: Like binary expressions, unary expressions involve
operands and operators. However, a unary expression involves only one operator and one
operand. These operators, like binary expression operators, also tend to generate many
mutants when compared to other mutation operators. These operators are especially
important when considering the state of a contract. For example, Solidity has been a
popular source of implementing decentralized online voting systems. Many of which rely
on the unary update or decrement operators that exist. Table A.2 lists the unary mutation
operators.
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Table A.2

Unary Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Abbreviations
Fault Types
- → DELETE
DLMN
Arithmetic Error
~ → DELETE
DLBN
Binary Arithmetic Error
! → DELETE
DLN
Conditional Error
++ → [DELETE, --]
DLINC, INCDEC
Arithmetic Error
- - → [DELETE, ++]
DLDEC, DECINC
Arithmetic Error
Assignment Expression Operators: Assignment expressions consist of an
assignment of a variable to some value, either another variable or some literal. Beyond
the ordinary assignment expression, Solidity as well supports compound assignments.
Compound assignments are an assignment along with an arithmetic operator. When
performing a mutation with an assignment expression operator, it is important to consider
the type of variable that is in the assignment expression. For instance, many of the
compound string assignments that exist in languages such as Java, are not supported in
Solidity. Instead, these mutation operators are only relevant for numerical types such as
integers. However, numerical types tend to be the dominant literal that exists in Solidity,
meaning that there will be plenty of instances where assignment expression operators will
generate mutants. Table A.3 lists the assignment mutation operators.
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Table A.3

Assignment Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
*= → [=, /=, +=, -=, %=, |=, &=, ^=]

Abbreviations
Fault Types
EMUE, MUEDE,
Arithmetic Error
MUEPE, MUEMNE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
MUEMOE, MUEOE,
MUEAE, MUEXOE
/= → [=, *=, +=, -=, %=, |=, &=, ^=] EDE, DEMUE, DEPE, Arithmetic Error
DEMNE, DEMOE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
DEOE, DEAE,
DEXOE
+= → [=, /=, *=, -=, %=, |=, &=, ^=] PEE, PEDE, PEMUE, Arithmetic Error
PEMNE, PEMOE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
PEOE, PEAD, PEXOE
-= → [=, /=, +=, *=, %=, |=, &=, ^=] MNEE, MNEDE,
Arithmetic Error
MNEPE, MNEMUE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
MNOE, MNEOE,
MNEAE, MNEXOE
%= → [=, /=, +=, -=, *=, |=, &=, ^=] MOEE, MOEDE,
Arithmetic Error
MOEPE, MOEMNE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
MOEMUE, MOEOE,
MOEAE, MOEXOE
|= → [=, /=, +=, -=, %=, *=, &=, ^=] OEE, OEDE, OEPE,
Arithmetic Error
OEMNE, OEMOE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
OEMUE, OEAE,
OEXOE
&= → [=, /=, +=, -=, %=, |=, *=, ^=] AEE, AEDE, AEPE,
Arithmetic Error
AEMNE, AEMOE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
AEOE, AEAE,
AEXOE
^= → [=, /=, +=, -=, %=, |=, &=, *=] XOEE, XOEDE,
Arithmetic Error
XOEPE, XOEMNE,
Ether Lost in Transfer
XOEMOE, XOEOE,
XOEAE, XOEMUE
= → [*=, /=, +=, -=, %=, |=, &=, ^=] EMUE, EDE, EPE,
Arithmetic Error
EMNE, EMOE, EOE, Ether Lost in Transfer
EAE, EXOE
Literal Expression Operators: Literals in code are a fixed value associated with a
type, such as an integer or string. In terms of mutation, literal operators modify the fixed
value to some other value. In Deviant, the mutation operators that associate with
numerical types typically either mutate to a zero or random non-zero value. The idea
behind mutating to one of these two values is that programs often times have specific

87
behavior defined for zero values and non-zero values. Strings are handled differently, in
that their content is either deleted or just modified. Arrays are handled by either changing
the length, making them dynamic, or making them fixed. In some instances, this might
not have much effect on the behavior of the application, but by changing these attributes
of the array there is a chance that the behavior is affected in some manner. Boolean
operators are quite simple as they are simply just change true to false and false to true.
Table A.4

Literal Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
String → [Delete, Add Content]
Integer → [Non-Zero, Zero]

Abbreviations
DLST, ADDST
INTNZ, INTZ

Hexadecimal → [Zero, Non-Zero]

HXZ, HXNZ

Bytes Array → [Modify Length]

BTAML

Fixed Array → Dynamic Array
Dynamic Array → Fixed Array
True → False
False → True

FADA
DAFA
TF
FT

Fault Types
Incorrect Literal
Arithmetic Error
Incorrect Literal
Arithmetic Error
Incorrect Literal
Overflow
Arithmetic Error
Memory Storage Change
Overflow
Conditional Error
Conditional Error

A.2 General Intra-Function Level Mutation Operators
Beyond the several Solidity-specific mutation operators, there are four more
general mutation operators that are applicable to the intra-function level. These mutation
operators include: Delete Statement (DS) or Delete Block (DB). In most cases, these
mutation operators work similarly to the mutation operators that were defined above.
However, these mutation operators are more general and do not specifically target unique
features of Solidity. In fact, the Solidity-specific mutation operators are rather a subset of
these operators.
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A.3 General Intra-Module Level Mutation Operators
Intra-Module Variable Modification Operators: These operators deal with the
state variables that exist in a parent-child relationship between contracts. In this category,
these variables are those that the child inherits from the parent. The specifics of the
mutation operators are as follows:
•

Hiding Variable Insertion (HVI): This mutation operator applies when a
parent contract contains a state variable that isn’t declared directly within
the child contract. This mutation operator inserts a variable of the same
name into the child contract. By performing this mutation, when that
variable is ever used in the context of the child contract, the child’s
version of the variable will be used. This can of course cause a variety of
potential errors to happen.

•

Hiding Variable Deletion (HVD): This mutation operator is applied when
a parent and child contract contain a global variable with the same name.
In this case, the mutation operator deletes this global variable from the
child contract. When this mutation operator is applied, it can potentially
cause the child contract to use the parent contract version of the variable.
Of course, this can cause a variety of potential errors to happen.

General Intra-Module Level Mutation Operators: Beyond the mutation operators
listed previously, there are also operators that deal with the relationship between a parent
contract and child contract beyond the scope of hiding variables. These mutation
operators are based on the class-level mutation operators provided by muJava, but with
the primary focus being on the behavior of Solidity instead. These operators are
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considered intra-module level because they mutate the content within the actual contract
itself (e.g., functions that are considered overriding). The overriding function operators
mutate the relationship between a child and parent contract in relation to the functions
that share the same name. For example, the Overriding Function Deletion (OFD) operator
deletes the signature and body of an overriding function that exists in a child contract. By
doing this, the parent contract’s version of the function will instead be used when that
function is called from the context of the child contract. This will cause unexpected
behavior as a developer would expect the child’s overriding function to be used instead.
The super keyword mutation operators are again involved in the relationship that exists
between a parent and child in relation to the programming constructs that have the same
shared name between the two contracts. Now, what is different between these super
keyword operators and the other mutation operators is that they do not delete or remove
the child or parent’s version of the programming construct. Instead, these mutation
operators take an individual instance of a programming construct with a shared name and
either insert or delete the super keyword. What this mutation does is cause the parent or
child’s version of the programming construct to be used whenever the original intention
was to use the opposite. The type-based operators are mutation operators that modify
instances where a parent or child can replace an instance of a contract that is being cast.
For example, the Cast Type Change (CTC) operator takes an instance of an address or
contract being cast to another contract and takes a valid (typically a parent or child)
contract and replaces the cast with the other contract instead. This will cause the cast
contract to behave as the newly casted type instead. Table A.5 lists the general intramodule level mutation operators.
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Table A.5

Intra-Module Level Mutation Operators

Mutation Operators
Overriding Function Deletion
Overriding Function Calling
Position Change
Overriding Function Rename
Super Keyword Insertion

Abbreviations
OFD
OFCP

Fault Types
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Function Behavior

OFR
SKI

Super Keyword Deletion

SKD

Type Cast Operator Insertion

TCOI

Type Cast Operator Deletion

TCOD

Cast Type Change

CTC

Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Variable Behavior
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Variable Behavior
Type Cast Error
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Variable Behavior
Type Cast Error
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Variable Behavior
Type Cast Error
Incorrect Function Behavior
Incorrect Variable Behavior

